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TOTAL ECLIPSE OF THE TWEET: HOW SOCIAL MEDIA
RESTRICTIONS ON STUDENT AND PROFESSIONAL
ATHLETES AFFECT FREE SPEECH
“The Internet is the largest experiment involving anarchy in
history.  Hundreds of millions of people are, each minute, creat-
ing and consuming an untold amount of digital content in an
online world that is not truly bound by terrestrial laws.”1
I. GIVE ME LIBERTY, OR GIVE ME “LIKES”: AN INTRODUCTION
“Tweet it; tag it; post it” may well be the mantra of the twenty-
first century.2  The days of dial-up are long gone, and a little red
notification symbol has replaced the formerly ubiquitous “you’ve
got mail.”3  Online social media platforms such as Facebook, Twit-
ter, Instagram, and Tumblr have become a daily component of our
lives, a virtual portal to express not-so-inner musings and thoughts.4
In fact, a resounding seventy-three percent of adults are reported to
utilize social networking sites, as well as eighty-one percent of
teens.5
1. Eric Schmidt & Jared Cohen, The New Digital Age: Reshaping the Future of
People, Nations and Business (Apr. 23, 2013), available at http://books.google.com/
books?id=FL_LPoLdGKsC&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=
0#v=onepage&q&f=false (noting that Internet’s ever-evolving nature is not readily
defined by laws).
2. See Adam Popescu, Just Who Uses Social Media? A Demographic Breakdown,
MASHABLE (Apr. 13, 2013), http://mashable.com/2013/04/12/social-media-dem-
ographic-breakdown/ (revealing high percentages of every demographic utilize so-
cial media).
3. See Top 10 Social Networking Sites, DISCOVERY NEWS (Dec. 12, 2012, 3:00 AM),
http://news.discovery.com/tech/apps/top-ten-social-networking-sites.htm (rank-
ing Facebook as number one social networking program, as of 2012).
4. See Patricia Reaney, Email Connects 85 Percent of the World; Social Media Con-
nects 62 Percent, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 27, 2012, 2:23 PM), http://www.huf-
fingtonpost.com/2012/03/27/email-connects-the-world_n_1381854.html
(highlighting that social media is only second to e-mails in terms of Internet
usage).
5. See Maeve Duggan & Aaron Smith, Social Media Update 2013, PEW RESEARCH
CENTER (Dec. 30, 2013), http://pewinternet.org/Reports/2013/Social-Media-Up-
date.aspx (reporting on high usage of social media by adults ages eighteen and
older). See also Part 1: Teens and Social Media Use, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (May 21,
2013), http://www.pewinternet.org/Reports/2013/Teens-Social-Media-And-Pri-
vacy/Main-Report/Part-1.aspx (noting vast majority of teens are utilizing social
media).
(311)
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312 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 22: p. 311
Athletes are no special exemption to this trend.6  And for stu-
dent athletes, social media is not merely a simple portal into the
virtual lives of their friends, but a direct channel of communication
with their growing fan base.7  In the realm of professional athletics,
social media facilitates an opportunity for athletes to strike endorse-
ment gold by mentioning brands to their thousands, at times mil-
lions, of followers.8  Many sports organizations, however, find social
media’s ease of expression troubling.9  Due to the rapid distribu-
tion of a post to a multitude of followers on social media sites such
as Twitter or Facebook, a public relations disaster is a simple “send”
button away.10  In order to combat athletes distributing potentially
damaging statements, sports organizations, in both the collegiate
and professional arena, have implemented restrictions on how ath-
letes use social media.11
Such restrictions may starkly infringe upon athletes’ funda-
mental First Amendment right to freedom of speech.12  For student
athletes competing in divisions set by the National Collegiate Ath-
letic Association (“NCAA”), the policies, which state schools’ imple-
ment, have a direct, negative effect on student athletes’ right to free
6. See Eric Adelson, Twitter 2012: How Athletes Have Used Social Media to Become
the Media, YAHOO! SPORTS (Dec. 23, 2012, 11:47 AM), http://sports.yahoo.com/
news/twitter-2012—how-athletes-have-used-social-media-to-become-the-media-
164755022.html (asserting that social media platforms such as Twitter allow for an
“immediacy” and “intimacy” which connect athletes to their fans in an quick, effec-
tive manner).
7. See Social Media Has Pros and Cons for Student Athletes, DAILYTARHEEL (Aug.
30, 2013, 1:07 AM), http://www.dailytarheel.com/article/2013/08/social-media-
has-pros-and-cons-for-student-athletes (describing costs and benefits for student
athletes of disclosing information on social media).
8. See Ben Pickering, Athletes and Social Media: Untapped Goldmine or PR
Landmine?, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 15, 2013, 1:42 PM), http://www.huf-
fingtonpost.com/ben-pickering/athletes-and-social-media_b_3082184.html
(describing brand growth opportunities for professional athletes who effectively
use social media).
9. See Jed Hughes, NFL Players’ Use of Social Media Is a Cause of Concern for
Teams, BLEACHER REPORT (Mar. 13, 2013), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/
1565617-nfl-athletes-use-of-social-media-is-a-cause-of-concern-for-teams (providing
example of how sporting organization could adjust its previously lenient social me-
dia policy to limit public relations backlash of its athletes).
10. See Pickering, supra note 8 (asserting that quick distribution of social me- R
dia can lead to disastrous press issues).
11. See Hughes, supra note 9 (noting organizations that have expressed restric- R
tions on athletes’ social media usage); Jamie P. Hopkins, Katie Hopkins & Bijan
Whelton, Being Social: Why the NCAA Has Forced Universities to Monitor Student Athletes’
Social Media, 13 U. PITT. J. TECH. L. & POL. 1,1 (2013) (highlighting that higher
education schools across country are implementing social media restriction poli-
cies to curb their athletes from potentially damaging schools’ reputation).
12. For a discussion of the constitutionality of student and professional ath-
lete speech restrictions, see infra notes 196-289 and accompanying text. R
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speech.13  Though professional athletes sign away their First
Amendment guarantees in their private contracts, they must be ex-
tremely cognizant of the social media policies of their particular
organization, as a deviation from their expressed standard of online
conduct could result in ample fines and penalties.14
Part II of this Comment introduces a background of online so-
cial networking, and addresses whether speech made on such plat-
forms falls within the purview of the First Amendment.15  Part III
discusses the free speech rights of college students, provides a back-
ground of common limits universities impose on student athletes’
online speech, and examines the limits professional sporting orga-
nizations place on professional athletes’ speech.16  Part IV argues
that universities’ online speech restrictions for student athletes are
unconstitutional and recommends permissible actions universities
may take.17  Part V analyzes the effectiveness of social media restric-
tions enforced by professional sport organizations, and provides
tips for athlete compliance.18  Part VI concludes that there should
be less restrictions on athletes’ speech, both at the collegiate and
professional level.19
II. PLANET OF THE POSTS: THE RISE AND IMPORTANCE
OF ONLINE SPEECH
Specifically, the term social media refers to “forms of elec-
tronic communication . . . through which users create online com-
munities to share information, ideas, personal messages, and other
13. See Hopkins, Hopkins & Whelton, supra note 11, at 31-32 (asserting un- R
constitutionality of certain schools’ social media restrictions, as such restrictions
may place overtly strict limits on athletes’ freedom of speech).
14. See Len Berman, When Social Media Gets Athletes in Trouble, MASHABLE (Jan.
4, 2010), http://mashable.com/2010/01/04/social-media-athletes/ (highlighting
examples of professional athletes being fined by their sport organizations for fail-
ing to adhere to their set social media guidelines).
15. For a discussion of the history of social media, see sources cited infra notes
20-36 and accompanying text. R
16. For a discussion of the speech restrictions for collegiate and professional
athletes, see sources cited infra notes 38-194 and accompanying text. R
17. For a discussion of the constitutionality of social media restrictions by uni-
versities against their student athletes, see infra notes 196-271 and accompanying R
text.
18. For a discussion of the efforts sport organizations have taken to restrict
the speech of their athletes, see infra notes 273-284 and accompanying text. R
19. For a discussion of the need to implement less stringent online-speech
policies, see Conclusion infra Part VI.
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content . . . .”20  Despite the fact that the term social media is cur-
rently applied liberally to ample Web sites, social media has a far
humbler beginning.21  Created in 1969, it is widely-held that Com-
puServe carved the first sphere of online social interaction, provid-
ing a platform for its members to not only share information, but to
actually send electronic messages to one another.22  Shortly after
the inception of CompuServe, the first Bulletin Board System
(“BBS”) spun its way into the Web and cultivated an elementary
foundation for an online digital community.23  Through a dial-up
connection, online users had the power to communicate in a true
virtual community setting.24  In the late 1980s, Quantum Computer
Services, Inc. opened its virtual doors, but later decided to change
its name to America Online Inc. (“AOL”).25  A decade later, AOL
boasted a whopping five million members.26  In 1997, AOL intro-
duced its Instant Messenger feature (“AIM”), and Web surfers
across the world began to add each other to their Buddy Lists.27
In 2002, Canadian-based platform Friendster heralded the
modern form of social networks, allowing users to establish an on-
20. See Social Media – Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-web-
ster.com/dictionary/social%20media (last seen Feb. 3, 2014) (stating definition
for social media).
21. See Shea Bennett, A Brief History of Social Media (1969-2012) [Infographic],
MEDIABISTRO (Jul. 4, 2013, 5:00 PM), http://www.mediabistro.com/alltwitter/so-
cial-media-1969-2012_b45869 (providing timeline of major events in history of so-
cial media). See also Gordon Goble, The History of Social Networking, DIGITAL TRENDS
(Sept. 6, 2012), http://www.digitaltrends.com/features/the-history-of-social-
networking/ (noting early beginnings of online social interaction).
22. See id. (highlighting that CompuServe offered initial version of true social
interaction in an online environment). See also Dr. Anthony Curtis, The Brief His-
tory of Social Media, UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA AT PEMBROKE (2013), http://
www.uncp.edu/home/acurtis/NewMedia/SocialMedia/SocialMediaHistory.html
(stating that CompuServe was “the first major commercial Internet service pro-
vider for the public in the United States”).
23. See Scott Gilbertson, Feb. 16, 1978: Bulletin Board Goes Electronic, WIRED
(Feb. 16, 2010, 12:00 AM), http://www.wired.com/thisdayintech/2010/02/
0216cbbs-first-bbs-bulletin-board/ (describing formation of BBS by Ward Christen-
sen and Randy Seuss, who wanted to create online platforms which resembled
community bulletin boards).
24. See id. (noting that due to complexity of successfully dialing into BBSs,
early users were generally computer enthusiasts).
25. See 25 Years of AOL: A Timeline, WASHINGTON POST (May 23, 2010, 7:08
PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/05/23/
AR2010052303551.html (providing list of major events in tech giant’s corporate
history).
26. See id. (describing AOL’s high growth within half decade).
27. See Matt Petronzio, A Brief History of Instant Messaging, MASHABLE (Oct. 25,
2012), http://mashable.com/2012/10/25/instant-messaging-history/ (emphasiz-
ing that until 2005 AIM “dominated the instant messaging market with 53 million
users”).
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line profile and connect with their real world friends.28  MySpace
launched a year later, providing a music-based version of Friendster
aimed for teenagers.29  Fast forward to a Harvard dorm room in
2004 where Mark Zuckerberg created “The Facebook.”30  Though
initially only available to college students, The Facebook was a plat-
form for university students to “add” each other as friends within
their own collegiate networks; but in 2006, Facebook (no longer
encumbered by an extraneous “the”) opened its virtual gates to
public access in order to expand its then already healthy 9 million-
member user base.31  That same year, Twitter weaved itself into the
Web, and enabled its users to “tweet” status-like posts in 140 charac-
ters or less.32  Instead of following Facebook and requiring two par-
ties to “add” one another as friends, Twitter enabled users to simply
“follow” other users.33  A click of Twitter’s “follow” button would
ensure that whatever the followed-user tweeted would simultane-
ously appear on the following-user’s News Feed; thus, a live, instan-
taneous gateway into thoughts of another became subscribable.34
As of 2014, Facebook and Twitter stand as social networking
Goliaths.35  In essence, the fundamental purpose of these Web sites
is to provide an easily accessible virtual sharing platform, in which
28. See Richard Nieva, Remember Friendster? Thought So, CNET (Feb. 4, 2014,
4:00 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-57618202-93/remember-friendster-
thought-so/ (noting that at its inception, Friendster was premier social connectiv-
ity Web site).
29. See Do You MySpace?, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 28, 2006), http://www.nytimes
.com/2005/08/28/fashion/sundaystyles/28MYSPACE.html?pagewanted=1&_r=0
(describing MySpace’s ultra-popularity with American youth).
30. See Sarah Phillips, A Brief History of Facebook, THE GUARDIAN (Jul. 24, 2007),
http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2007/jul/25/media.newmedia (noting
humble origins of Facebook).
31. See Janet Kornblum, Facebook Will Soon Be Available to Everyone, USA TODAY
(Sept. 11, 2006), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/tech/news/2006-09-11-
facebook-everyone_x.htm (describing addition of 500 public networks to
Facebook’s Web site).
32. See Nicholas Carlson, The Real History of Twitter, BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 13,
2011, 1:30 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/how-twitter-was-founded-2011-4
(highlighting founding story of popular social networking site).
33. See id. (describing functioning capabilities of Twitter).
34. See id. (noting quickness and real-time nature of tweeting).
35. See Brad Stone & Sarah Frier, Facebook Turns 10: The Mark Zuckerberg Inter-
view, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Jan. 30, 2014), http://www.businessweek.com/ar-
ticles/2014-01-30/facebook-turns-10-the-mark-zuckerberg-interview (stating that as
of its tenth year anniversary, 1.23 billion people globally use Facebook). See also
Jim Edwards, Twitter’s ‘Dark Pool’: IPO Doesn’t Mention 651 Million Users Who Aban-
doned Twitter, BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 6, 2013, 9:07 AM), http://www.businessinsider
.com/twitter-total-registered-users-v-monthly-active-users-2013-11 (noting that
while Twitter’s total user base is not officially known, Twitter reports active user
base of 200 million people).
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participating users further fuel this increasingly inter-connected
world.36
III. TAG ME, MAYBE?: AN OVERVIEW OF FREE SPEECH RIGHTS AND
RESTRICTIONS FOR STUDENT AND PROFESSIONAL ATHLETES
“Whoever would overthrow the liberty of a nation must begin by
subduing the freeness of speech.”37
Two hundred years after its inclusion to the Constitution, the
Bill of Rights remains a monument to the legacy of freedom the
Framers wished to cement; atop this monument lies the First
Amendment and its guarantee of freedom of speech.38  In this Part,
Section A discusses free speech jurisprudence the limitations associ-
ated with free speech.39  Section B explains the Supreme Court’s
stance on online speech.40  Section C explores speech rights tradi-
tionally associated with high school students.41  Next, it notes the
relationship of free speech rights between high school students and
college students, and Section D discusses the special distinction of
collegiate athletes within these classifications.42  Next, Section D il-
lustrates how universities are infringing on the online speech rights
of student athletes.43  Finally, Section E outlines the social media
36. See Reaney, supra note 4 (suggesting that sharing aspect of social media R
certainly encompasses notions of speech and expression).
37. See Amendment I: Freedom of Religion, Speech, Press, and Assembly, THE RUTHER-
FORD INSTITUTE, https://www.rutherford.org/constitutional_corner/amendment_
i_freedom_of_religion_speech_press_and_assembly/ (last visited Mar. 14, 2014)
(quoting Ben Franklin to emphasize notion that freedom of speech and democ-
racy are intertwined concepts).
38. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an es-
tablishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assem-
ble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.”).  The Fourteenth
Amendment ensures against states violating constitutional guarantees. See U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV; Hopkins, Hopkins, & Whelton supra note 11, at 35-6 (discuss- R
ing how Bill of Rights liability is extended to states).
39. For a discussion of the limitations associated with free speech, see infra
notes 45-88 and accompanying text. R
40. For a discussion of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in relationship to
Internet censorship, see infra notes 89-95 and accompanying text. R
41. For a discussion of students’ rights to free speech, see infra notes 99-103 R
and accompanying text.
42. For a discussion of collegiate students’ right to free speech, see sources
cited infra notes 104-118 and accompanying text. R
43. For a discussion of the state universities’ infringement of student athletes’
free speech rights, see infra notes 119-171 and accompanying text. R
6
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 22, Iss. 1 [2015], Art. 8
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol22/iss1/8
36293-vls_22-1 Sheet No. 167 Side A      04/07/2015   08:38:16
36293-vls_22-1 Sheet No. 167 Side A      04/07/2015   08:38:16
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLS\22-1\VLS108.txt unknown Seq: 7 31-MAR-15 14:02
2015] TOTAL ECLIPSE OF THE TWEET 317
speech restrictions professional sports organizations impose on pro-
fessional athletes.44
A. Free Speech Jurisprudence
Government-enacted restrictions on speech are typically classi-
fied into two categories: content-neutral restrictions and content-
based restrictions.45  Prior restraint occurs when the government
attempts to restrict speech before its utterance.46  When determin-
ing a potential violation of free speech, each category asserts its own
analysis; therefore, the classification of a government restriction is
vital to determining its constitutionality.47
1. Content-Neutral Restrictions
Content-neutral restrictions can be identified as limitations
upon the time, place, or manner of speech.48  To determine if a law
is content-neutral, the law must be “justified without reference to
the content of the regulated speech.”49  As the Supreme Court
44. For a discussion of the speech restrictions on professional athletes, see
infra notes 172-194 and accompanying text. R
45. See ERWIN CHERMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND PROPER-
TIES, § 11.2.1 at 960-61 (Vicki Been et al., 4th ed. 2011).
46. See Martin H. Redish, The Proper Role of the Prior Restraint Doctrine in First
Amendment Theory, 70 VA. L. REV 53, 53 (1984) (stating that “[u]nder the prior
restraint doctrine, the government may not restrain a particular expression prior
to its dissemination even though the same expression could be constitutionally
subject to punishment after dissemination.”).
47. For an in-depth discussion of content-neutral restrictions, content-based
restrictions, and prior restraint, see infra notes 48-98 and accompanying text. R
48. See Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 486 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)
(stating that “expression, whether oral or written or symbolized by conduct, is sub-
ject to reasonable time, place, or manner restrictions”).  When the government
implements restrictions that limit the expressive nature of speech, the government
interest is examined to determine the restriction’s validity. See Texas v. Johnson,
491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989) (citing Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Watt, 703 F.2d
586, 622-23 (1983) (Scalia, J., dissenting)) (asserting that content neutrality can
also be applied to expressive conduct). See also United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S.
367, 377 (1968) (noting that if government focused on “nonspeech” element of
restriction, “incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms” are permissi-
ble).  The O’Brien Court established the following factors when determining if a
government restriction on speech is constitutional: (1) if the restriction furthers a
substantial government interest; (2) if that interest is unrelated to suppressing free
expression; and (3) if incidental First Amendment infractions are no greater than
what is necessary to further the government interest. See id. (listing ways in which
government speech restriction can be appropriate limitation on First Amendment
speech rights).
49. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (citing Clark v.
Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 295 (1984)) (stating that if govern-
ment’s purpose of speech restriction was unrelated to expressive content of
speech, then speech restriction is classified as content-neutral).
7
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stated in Ward v. Rock Against Racism, “[t]he principal inquiry in
determining content neutrality . . .  is whether the government has
adopted a regulation of speech because of disagreement with the
message it conveys.”50  Thus, high emphasis is placed on the gov-
ernment’s purpose in creating the law.51
Additionally, as the Supreme Court stressed in City of Renton v.
Playtime Theaters, Inc., a law is regarded as content-neutral if the gov-
ernment’s ultimate purpose lies within the secondary effects of lim-
iting speech, and not with the specific content of speech itself.52  In
Renton, the Court held that a Washington state zoning ordinance
prohibiting the presence of adult theaters was a content-neutral re-
striction, as the ordinance was created in regards to controlling ex-
ternal factors such as the city’s crime rate, commerce, and property
values.53  These external factors reflected the city’s predominant
concern with the secondary effects of the ordinance, and revealed
that the city was not interested in “[suppressing] the expression of
unpopular views.54  Consequently, content-neutral restrictions may
be determined by their correlation to secondary effects; however,
an audience’s reaction and the “emotive impact of speech” are not
representative of a law’s secondary effects.55  Such considerations
50. Id. (holding that if government established regulation because it dis-
agreed with content of speech, regulation would be invalid).
51. See id. at 801 (noting that law’s constitutionality depends on government’s
interest in correcting overall societal issue).
52. See City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47-9 (1986)
(describing secondary effects doctrine).
53. See id. at 48 (asserting that city’s ordinance concerned secondary effects of
speech as “[t]he ordinance by its terms [was] designed to prevent crime, protect
the city’s retail trade, maintain property values, and generally ‘protec[t] and
preserv[e] the quality of [the city’s] neighborhoods, commercial districts, and the
quality of urban life’”).
54. See id. (quoting Justice Powell as stating “[i]f the city had been concerned
with restricting the message purveyed by adult theaters, it would have tried to close
them or restrict their number rather than circumscribe their choice as to loca-
tion.” (citing Young v. Am. Mini Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 82 (1976))).  The
Renton Court heavily emphasized if the city’s ordinance relied upon the content of
speech, the ordinance would no longer be considered content-neutral, but would
rather be content-based. See id. at 48-9  (“The ordinance does not contravene the
fundamental principle that underlies our concern about ‘content-based’ speech
regulations: that ‘government may not grant the use of a form to people whose
views it finds acceptable, but deny use to those wishing to express less favored or
more controversial views.” (citing Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92,
95-96 (1972))).
55. See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 320 (1988) (affirming Renton’s utilization
of secondary effects doctrine, but limiting its application to “justifications for regu-
lations [that] have nothing to do with content”).  However, laws that focus on lis-
teners’ direct response to speech are distinguishable from Renton, and thus not
susceptible to its analysis. See id. at 321 (arguing that targeting audience’s emo-
tional response to speech does not fall within secondary effects).
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are seen as primary effects of speech restriction, and thus strip a law
of its content neutrality.56
Once a law is classified as a content-neutral restriction, it is
tested under intermediate scrutiny.57  Intermediate scrutiny re-
quires that legislation be narrowly tailored to promote a substantial
government interest, while also leaving ample alternative channels
of communication.58  In analyzing whether the government action
is narrowly tailored, the Ward Court held that restrictions cannot
“regulate expression in such a manner that a substantial portion of
the burden on speech does not serve to advance its goals.”59  Thus,
a content-neutral restriction is appropriately narrowly tailored if the
speech limitations directly align with the government’s interest.60
With regards to the availability of other communication methods,
the speech limitation must not render alternative channels inade-
quate for speech.61
2. Content-Based Restrictions
Content-based restrictions on speech limit speech because of
its “message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.”62  Due to
their restrictions upon the substantive content of speech, content-
56. See id.  (asserting that if law focuses on primary impact of speech, then law
is content-based restriction).
57. See Wilson R. Huhn, Assessing the Constitutionality of Laws That Are Both Con-
tent-Based and Content-Neutral: The Emerging Constitutional Calculus, 79 IND. L.J. 801,
805-06 (2004) (noting that time, place, or manner restrictions upon speech un-
dergo intermediate scrutiny).
58. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799-800 (1989) (describ-
ing prongs of intermediate scrutiny analysis for content neutral restriction on
speech).
59. See id. (noting that restrictions on time, place, or manner of speech can-
not burden speech that is extraneous to government interest).
60. See id. (stating that “even complete bans of speech could be construed as
content neutral, ‘but only if each activity within the proscription’s scope is an ap-
propriately targeted evil’” (quoting Frisby v. Shultz, 487 U.S. 474, 485 (1988))).
61. See id. at 802 (holding that ordinance limiting noise from bandstands left
ample channels of communication as it did not restrict any expressive activity, only
amplification of bandstand volume).  However, the government bears no burden
to ensure that the speech limitation is the least restrictive method for achieving its
purposes. See id. at 800 (“So long as the means chosen are not substantially
broader than necessary to achieve the government’s interest, however, the regula-
tion will not be invalid simply because a court concludes that the government’s
interest could be adequately served by some less-speech-restrictive alternative.”).
62. See Police Dep’t of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972). See also
United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 811-12 (2000) (emphasiz-
ing that “the essence of content-based restriction . . .  focuses only on the content
of the speech and the direct impact that speech has on its listeners” (quoting Boos
v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988))).
9
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based restrictions are presumably invalid.63  This adherence to the
sheer right of speech is equally, if not more, accentuated when the
government aims to restrict potentially offensive speech.64  As Jus-
tice Brennan expressed in Texas v. Johnson, “[i]f there is a bedrock
principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the govern-
ment may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because
society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.”65
As content-based restrictions limit the core content of speech,
such restrictions must undergo a strict scrutiny analysis.66  Content-
based restrictions may pass strict scrutiny if the limitation is “nar-
rowly tailored to promote a compelling Government interest . . .
[and] [i]f a less restrictive alternative would serve the Govern-
ment’s purpose, the legislature must use that alternative.”67  In in-
stances where speech limitations are designed to curb listeners’
susceptibility to offensiveness, the Supreme Court directed, in
United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., that “[w]here the
designed benefit of a content-based restriction is to shield the sensi-
bilities of listeners, the general rule is that the right of expression
prevails, even where no less restrictive alternative exists.”68  In Play-
boy Entertainment, the Supreme Court held that a law requiring cable
providers to block sexually explicit programs during the hours chil-
63. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) (stating that “[t]he
First Amendment generally prevents government from proscribing speech, or even
expressive conduct, because of disapproval of ideas expressed.” (citation
omitted)).
64. See Boos, 485 U.S. at 322 (noting that “in public debate our own citizens
must tolerate insulting, and even outrageous, speech in order to provide adequate
breathing space to the freedoms protected by the First Amendment” (internal
quotations marks omitted) (citations omitted)). See also United States v. Playboy
Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 817 (2000) (“It is through speech that our convic-
tions and beliefs are influenced and expressed, and tested.  It is through speech
that we bring those beliefs to bear on Government and on society.  It is through
speech that our personalities are formed and expressed.  The citizen is entitled to
seek out or reject certain ideas or influences without Government interference or
control.”).
65. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989)  (holding Texas law prohibit-
ing flag burning was unconstitutional, as flag burning is expressive conduct that
cannot be assuaged by Texas’s fear of peace disturbance).
66. See Glendale Assocs., Ltd. v. NLRB, 347 F.3d 1145, 1155 (9th Cir. 2003)
(“Content-based restrictions must be analyzed under strict scrutiny because such
restrictions are especially likely to be improper attempts to value form forms of
speech over others, or are particularly susceptible to being used by the government
to distort public debate.” (internal quotations omitted) (citation omitted)).
67. See Playboy, 529 U.S. at 813, 813-817 (citations omitted) (providing tem-
plate of strict scrutiny analysis and noting government holds burden to prove law’s
validity when restricting speech content).
68. See id. at 813 (stating that audience sensibility not compelling justification
for government restriction of speech).
10
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dren were most likely to watch television was an unconstitutional
content-based restriction upon speech.69  The Court noted, “even
where speech is indecent and enters the home, the objective of
shielding children does not suffice to support a blanket ban if the
protection can be accomplished by a less restrictive alternative.”70
Thus, the mere availability of alternative communication channels
does not satisfy strict scrutiny; instead, the government must prove
that its law is the least restrictive measure to effect its purposes.71
However, there are certain classifications of speech that the
government may limit, even through content-based restrictions.72
Speech that exempts the government from the rigidity of content-
based restrictions may be divided into six classifications: obscenity,
defamatory language, incitement, fraud, speech integral to criminal
conduct, and fighting words.73  Such speech is regarded as “low
value,” and thus not warranted First Amendment protection.74
3. Prior Restraint
Regardless if a speech restriction is classified content-neutral
or content-based, the government is generally not permitted to re-
strict speech before it occurs.75  Such action is known as prior re-
69. See id. at 827 (holding that § 505 of Telecommunications Act of 1996
failed to use least restrictive means for its purpose).
70. See id. at 814 (noting significance of less-intrusive available alternatives to
blanket restrictions on speech).
71. See Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 874 (1997) (stating if
least restrictive alternatives are equally effective as enacted law, government failed
burden to prove its utilization of least restrictive method).
72. See Daniel Berger, Constitutional Combat: Is Fighting a Form of Free Speech? The
Ultimate Fighting Championship and Its Struggle Against the State of New York Over the
Message of Mixed Martial Arts, 20 MOORAD SPORTS L.J. 381, 413-14 (2013) (naming
“narrowly limited classes of speech” which are subject to content-based
restrictions).
73. See generally Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 36-7 (1973) (establishing ob-
scenity as unprotected speech); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 264-65
(1964) (precluding defamatory language from First Amendment protection);
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (prohibiting speech causing incite-
ment as protected); Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Coun-
cil, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976) (declining fraudulent speech as protected
speech); Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498 (1949) (refusing
speech integral to criminal conduct as receiving First Amendment protection);
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) (excluding fighting
words from protected class of speech).
74. See Cass. R. Sunstein, Words, Conduct, Caste, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 795, 843
(1993) (concluding that low value speech of pornography and hate speech would
cause “sufficient harms” under regulatory standards).
75. See New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 716 (1971) (Black, J.,
concurring) (quoting James Madison as stating that “[t]he people shall not be
deprived or abridged of their right to speak, to write, or to publish their
sentiments . . . .”).
11
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straint.76  Prior restraint restrictions reflect the government’s efforts
to restrain speech before it is spoken, as opposed to punishing it’s
effects afterwards.77  These pre-emptive limitations on speech are
highly frowned upon, as they are seen as impositions on speech
based “on predictions of dangers that would not actually material-
ize and thus would not be the basis for subsequent punishments.”78
Once challenged, the government possesses a substantial burden to
prove the validity of the speech restriction.79  In New York Times v.
United States, the Supreme Court rejected the U.S. government’s ef-
fort to preliminarily suppress the publication of select classified arti-
cles within the New York Times.80  As Justice Black noted in his
concurrence, the government’s justification of national security was
far too overbroad and vague to constitute a compelling reason to
override prior restraint.81
However, the Supreme Court has recognized instances in
which the government may appropriately restrict citizens’ speech
before it occurs.82  As the Court held in Forsyth County v. Nationalist
76. See Redish, supra note 46, at 53 (defining prior restraint doctrine). R
77. See CHERMERINSKY, supra note 45, at 978-79 (“The clearest definition of R
prior restraint is as an administrative system or judicial order that prevents speech
from occurring.”). See also Nebraska Press Ass’n. v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559
(1976) (“[P]rior restraints on speech and publication are the most serious and
least tolerable infringement on First Amendment rights.”).
78. See CHERMERINSKY, supra note 45, at 983 (“A free society prefers to punish R
the few who abuse rights of speech after they break the law than to throttle them
and all others beforehand.”).
79. See Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971)
(describing government’s paramount burden when court examines prior restraint
restrictions). See also Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963) (“Any
system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy pre-
sumption against its constitutional validity.” (citation omitted)); Near v. Minne-
sota, 283 U.S. 697, 733 (1931) (holding that “no more than that every man shall
have a right to speak, write, and print his opinions upon any subject whatsoever,
without any prior restraint” (citation omitted)).
80. See New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (holding
that New York Times’s speech was unconstitutionally restrained when government
prohibited its publication of “History of U.S. Decision-Making Process on Viet
Nam Policy”).
81. See id. at 719 (stating that usage of term “security” constituted “a broad,
vague generality whose contours should not be invoked to abrogate the fundamen-
tal law embodied in the First Amendment.”). Overbreadth issues may arise if a law
is not narrowly tailored to support its goals. See Chemerinsky, supra note 45, at 972 R
(“A law is unconstitutionally overbroad, if it regulates substantially more speech
than the Constitution allows to be regulated, and a person to whom the law consti-
tutionally can be applied can argue that it would be unconstitutional as applied to
others.”).
82. See Michael I. Meyerson, Rewriting Near v. Minnesota: Creating a Complete
Definition of Prior Restraint, 52 MERCER L. REV. 1087, 1107-08 (2001) (describing
instances in which government bans on speech do not fall under prior restraint
and are permissible).
12
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Movement, the government-enacted scheme must first not delegate
broad authority to government officials.83  Second, speech limita-
tions must not restrict the content of the speech.84  Third, the re-
strictions must be narrowly tailored to serve a significant
government interest.85  And last, the scheme must leave ample
channels of communication.86
Ultimately, if the government would like to restrict speech in a
constitutionally permissible fashion, the restriction should be nar-
rowly tailored to serve a governmental interest unrelated to the ac-
tual content of speech.87  Government action faces an uphill battle
of validity when such restrictions are placed upon the content of
speech or aim to restrict the speech before it occurs.88
B. Online Speech Jurisprudence
In the landmark decision of Reno v. American Civil Liberties
Union, the Supreme Court refused to establish a layer of censorship
over the Internet through the Communications Decency Act
(“CDA”).89  While the CDA aimed to prohibit sexually-charged
communication between adults and minors, the Court ultimately
rejected the Act’s restrictions on Internet speech, holding that the
CDA’s restrictions on conduct were overtly vague, and thus could
result in a chilling of speech.90  Further, the Court held that the
83. See Forsyth Cnty. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 130 (1992) (rec-
ognizing that even though prior restraint faces strong presumption of invalidity,
government may tailor speech limitation scheme to be constitutionally
permissible).
84. See id. at 131 (asserting that if scheme involves “appraisal of facts, exercise
of judgment, and the formation of an opinion,” First Amendment considerations
outweigh any benefit of censorship (citing Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296,
305 (1940); Southeastern Promotions, Inc. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 553 (1975))).
85. See id. at 130 (arguing that in Forsyth, decision to limit speech solely resides
with administrator’s discretion).  The Court pointed out that, in the case at hand,
there were no “articulated standards” or “objective factors” to guide administrators
when limiting speech. See id. at 133 (asserting that absence of guidelines allows
administrators to make decision in arbitrary manner).
86. See id. at 130 (describing need for alternative methods of communication,
in order to not entirely suppress citizens’ speech).
87. See generally Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989).
88. See generally United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803
(2000).
89. See Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 885 (1997) (holding
that “[t]he interest in encouraging freedom of expression in a democratic society
outweighs any theoretical but unproven benefit of censorship.”).
90. See id. at 871-72 (arguing that CDA’s “patently offensive” standard against
online speech is too vague).  Ultimately, the Court held that the CDA represented
a blanket prohibition against the primary effects of speech, and was accordingly a
content-based restriction on speech, and therefore constitutionally impermissible.
13
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CDA’s “lack of precision” in restricting online speech resulted in a
large suppression of protected speech.91  Justice Stevens opined
that “the content on the Internet is as diverse as human thought”
and provided the following commentary on the special importance
of Internet speech:
[T]he Internet can hardly be considered a “scarce” ex-
pressive commodity. It provides relatively unlimited, low-
cost capacity for communication of all kinds  . . . .  This
dynamic, multifaceted category of communication in-
cludes not only traditional print and news services, but
also audio, video, and still images, as well as interactive,
real-time dialogue. Through the use of chat rooms, any
person with a phone line can become a town crier with a
voice that resonates farther than it could from any soap-
box. Through the use of Web pages, mail exploders, and
newsgroups, the same individuals can become a
pamphleteer.92
While the use of a phone line has become nearly extinct, the
notion of the significance of unrestrained Internet speech still
thrives within the judiciary.93  In Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, the
Court again refused to apply Internet censorship through Con-
gress’ Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1966 (“CPPA”).94
While Congress aimed to prohibit the possession or distribution of
suggestive child images created through digital sources, the Court
rejected the overbroad scope of the CPPA.95
See id. at 870 (rejecting Renton analysis because CDA targeted “direct impact of
speech”).
91. See id. at 874 (asserting that “[i]n order to deny minors access to poten-
tially harmful speech, the CDA effectively [suppressed] a large amount of speech
that adults have a constitutional right to receive and to address to one another.”).
92. See id. at 870 (emphasizing importance of Internet as source of expression
for citizens, and to respect its expressive nature, courts should apply strict scrutiny
standards for its limitation).
93. See generally Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002) (de-
clining censorship of Internet through Child Pornography Prevention Act of
1996); Ashcroft v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 542 U.S. 656 (2004) (prohibiting
Internet censorship through Child Online Protection Act).
94. See Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 258 (2002) (holding that Congress’s
limitation on Internet was too overbroad and thus unconstitutional).  The Court
also noted that because COPA’s provisions are already deemed overbroad, no anal-
ysis needs to be conducted regarding the potential vagueness of statutory lan-
guage. See id. at 255 (stating that “[t]he overbreadth doctrine prohibits the
[g]overnment from banning unprotected speech if a substantial amount of pro-
tected speech is prohibited or chilled in the process.”).
95. See id. (stressing that “[p]rotected speech does not become unprotected
merely because it resembles the latter”).
14
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This adherence to the strict scrutiny standard is noteworthy, as
the Court is affirming the importance of open Internet speech and
expression by forcing the government to meet the highest stan-
dards of compliance.96  Consequently, speech uttered via social me-
dia may be even more protected as it serves as a figurative, albeit
digital, message board to convey the writer’s literal thoughts.97  The
inherent flexibility and sheer connectivity of social media allows
users to directly engage in “public discourse,” and thus further pro-
vides persuasion against its restriction.98
C. Student Speech Jurisprudence
In the oft-cited words of Justice Fortas in Tinker v. Des Moines
Independent Community School District, “[i]t can hardly be argued that
either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to free-
dom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.”99  In Tinker,
the Court upheld the freedom of speech and expression of high
school students who refused to remove their black armbands, which
they wore to silently show “their disapproval of Vietnam hostilities
and their advocacy of a truce” for the Vietnam War.100  Analogizing
the wearing of the armbands to “pure speech,” the Court stated that
school officials “sought to punish petitioners for a silent, passive
expression of opinion.”101  Establishing the standard for student
rights in school, the Court went on to assert that such pure speech,
when accompanied with an “undifferentiated fear or apprehension
of disturbance[,]” cannot permit school authorities to suppress stu-
96. See Am. Civil Liberties Union, 542 U.S. at 661 (affirming that Congress’s
second attempt at restricting availability of child pornography online still did not
meet burdens associated with strict scrutiny).
97. See Reno, 521 U.S. at 870 (stressing importance of Internet as expressive
speech).
98. See Am. Civil Liberties Union, 542 U.S. at 629 (asserting that social media’s
role in cultivating ‘self-operating marketplace of ideas’ further provides evidence
of its need for speech protection).
99. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)
(asserting that even in school-controlled environments, students are still entitled
to their constitutional freedoms).
100. See id. at 514 (noting that wearing of wristband was silent act of protest
against Vietnam War efforts).
101. Id. at 508 (commenting that students’ actions did not affect any of
school’s surroundings).  “There is no evidence whatever of petitioner’s interfer-
ence, actual or nascent, with the schools’ work or of collision with the rights of
other students to be secure and to be let alone.” See id. (asserting there was no
evidence to point to disrupting nature of students’ expressive speech).
15
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dent speech.102  In the spirit of true, unencumbered freedom, Jus-
tice Fortas noted the following:
Any departure from absolute regimentation may cause
trouble. Any variation from the majority’s opinion may in-
spire fear. Any word spoken, in class, in the lunchroom, or
on the campus, that deviates from the views of another
person may start an argument or cause a disturbance. But
our Constitution says we must take this risk; and our his-
tory says that it is this sort of hazardous freedom—this
kind of openness—that is basis of our national strength
and of the independence and vigor of Americans who
grow up and live in this relatively permissive, often dispu-
tatious, society.103
1. College Student Speech
In the context of higher education, state universities are the
equivalent of state actors.104  Thus, actions taken by state universi-
ties are regarded as public actions subject to constitutional re-
view.105  Conversely, private institutions are not state actors,
therefore, not subject to First Amendment suits.106
Further, while Tinker established the foundation for student
speech in the context of a high school, the question remains
whether such standards apply to students within a university set-
ting.107  Though the Supreme Court has not yet expressly recon-
ciled this issue, in Healy v. James, the Court noted that “the college
classroom with its surrounding environs is peculiarly the ‘market-
place of ideas,’” and, as such, the academic freedoms must certainly
102. See id. (highlighting that mere difference of opinion cannot be substan-
tial grounds for revocation of freedom of speech and expression rights, as “any
departure from absolute regimentation may cause trouble”).
103. See id. at 508-09 (spotlighting importance of maintaining right to vocalize
speech, as United States gains fortitude through discourse of varying opinion).
104. See Eric D. Bentley, He Tweeted What? A First Amendment Analysis of the Use
of Social Media By College Athletes and Recommended Best Practices For Athletic Depart-
ments, 38 J.C. & U.L. 451, 453 (2012) (drawing parallel between state actors and
state universities).
105. See id.  (stating that actions taken by state universities are regarded as
public actions subject to constitutional review).
106. See generally NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179 (1988) (holding that
NCAA, as  private organization, not considered state actor).
107. See generally J. Wes Gay, Note, Hands off Twitter: Are NCAA Student-Athlete
Social Media Bans Unconstitutional?, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 781, 789-792 (2012) (as-
serting that “age and maturity level should be weighed when determining how and
when rights of students will be protected.”).
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be protected.108  Relying on Tinker’s analysis, the Healy Court ex-
amined whether a student activity caused a disruption within the
academic community and concluded that students, even in light of
their fundamental right of speech, must still respect the school reg-
ulations “with respect to the time, the place, and the manner” in
which speech activity is to be conducted.109
Lower courts have penned their insistence upon the special cir-
cumstances concerning collegiate learning environments.110  In
DeJohn v. Temple University, the Third Circuit recognized distaste for
the creation of a chilling effect on student speech.111  Citing Healey,
the DeJohn court affirmed that “the vigilant protection of constitu-
tional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community of
American schools,” and thus held that Temple University’s policy
against harassment was an overbroad prohibition of students’ rights
to speech.112  The Third Circuit further held, in McCauley v. Univer-
sity of the Virgin Islands, that since “[t]he university atmosphere of
speculation, experiment, and creation is essential to the quality of
higher education,” public universities need lenience in their restric-
tions of student speech to best encourage the minds of students.113
2. Collegiate Athlete Speech Restrictions
All college students are not created equal.114  Though a bold
claim, the veracity of the statement is readily apparent when com-
108. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972) (applying Tinker standards to
collegiate environment).
109. See id. 192-93 (stating that school mandated agreements to comply with
university’s code of conduct is not infringement of students’ right to free speech).
A college administration may impose a requirement . . . that a group
seeking official recognition affirm in advance its willingness to adhere to
reasonable campus law. . . .  This is a minimal requirement, in the interest
of the entire academic community, of any group seeking the privilege of
official recognition.
See id.
110. See generally DeJohn v. Temple Univ., 537 F.3d 301 (2008); McCauley v.
Univ. of the Virgin Islands, 618 F.3d 232 (2010).
111. See DeJohn, 537 F.3d at 313-14 (noting that “overbreadth review is a neces-
sary means of preventing a ‘chilling effect’ on protected expression” (citing
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 630 (1973)).
112. See id. at. 319-20 (“[W]e do believe that a school has a compelling inter-
est in preventing harassment.  Yet, unless harassment is qualified with a standard
akin to a server or pervasive requirement, a harassment policy may suppress core
protected speech.”).
113. See McCauley, 618 F.3d at 242-43 (stressing that “[f]ree speech is ‘the life-
blood of academic freedom’” (citing DeJohn, 537 F.3d at 314)).
114. See Meg Penrose, Outspoken: Social Media and the Modern College Athlete, 12
J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 509, 510 (2013) (emphasizing special nature of
college athletes as compared to their typical college student counterparts).
17
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paring typical college students to college athletes.115  The responsi-
bilities of student athletes have rarely been bound to the locker
room and the field; accordingly, student athletes face a host of re-
strictions compared to their fellow classmates.116  Subject to special-
ized Student Athlete Codes of Conduct, collegiate athletes face
rules concerning matters such as drug testing, academic standards,
and curfews.117  Alongside these separately tailored codes of con-
duct, universities also utilize documents such as the National Letter
of Intent and the Student Athlete Statement to create a contractual
relationship to additionally bind athletes to further
specifications.118
D. Online Speech Restrictions on Student Athletes
It is without doubt that student athletes can use social media
for positive sharing activities, such as connecting with friends, fam-
ily members, and fans.119  Conversely, however, the potential re-
mains for student athletes to employ their virtual voice to spread
negativity.120  Cautious of social media’s darker aspects, the NCAA
requires schools to engage in some form of review over student ath-
letes’ social networking.121  However, universities are without de-
tailed guidance on how to appropriately conduct such monitoring,
and as a result, schools have established an array of restrictive social
media policies against student athletes.122  Schools justify their con-
stricting online speech standards by citing to the importance of
115. See id. at 510-11 (noting that collegiate athletes “regularly agree to rules
and regulations that are not imposed on ordinary college students, including poli-
cies relating to grooming, gambling, drinking, pornography, taunting, cursing,
and even tobacco use.”).
116. See id. at 523 (arguing that “athletes have long been held to different
standards, and their speech rights are qualitatively distinct from the public’s at
large”).
117. See id. at 524 (commenting on amount of deference and power collegiate
athletes confer upon their coaches and educational institutions overall).
118. See Patrick Stubblefield, Evading the Tweet Bomb: Utilizing Financial Aid
Agreements to Avoid First Amendment Litigation and NCAA Sanctions, 41 J. L. & EDUC.
593, 598-99 (2012) (describing presence of contractual relationship between col-
legiate athletes and institutions).
119. See Kayleigh R. Mayer, Comment, Colleges and Universities All Atwitter: Con-
stitutional Implications of Regulating and Monitoring Student Athletes’ Twitter Usage, 23
MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 455, 457 (2013) (noting that student athletes can utilize
social media to “show their personalities, pump up fans for games, and thank fans
for their continued support”).
120. See id. (noting potential of negative effects of social media usage).
121. For a discussion of NCAA required social media monitoring, see infra
notes 124-139 and accompanying text. R
122. For a discussion of differing university social media policies, see infra
notes 140-159 and accompanying text. R
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maintaining institutional image, as well as a general desire to con-
trol the scope of student athletes’ online speech.123
1. NCAA Policies on Social Media Monitoring
The NCAA is responsible for encouraging the regulation of
student athlete speech.124  Initiated to equal the playing field in
terms of recruitment, the NCAA does not mandate its over 1,000
member schools to monitor student athletes’ social media activity
in one precise manner.125  Rather, the NCAA simply requires that
schools engage in some form of meaningful monitoring of the ath-
letes’ online activity, leaving the method of this review entirely up
to the schools.126  Noting its absence in defined policy, the NCAA
has stated that “[w]hile we do not impose an absolute duty upon
member institutions to regularly monitor such sites, the duty to do
so may arise as part of an institution’s heightened awareness when it
has or should have a reasonable suspicion of rules violations.”127
In 2011, the NCAA took an active stance in enforcing social
media guidelines within its member schools.128  The University of
North Carolina at Chapel Hill (“UNC”) football program was sub-
ject to an NCAA investigation after defensive lineman Marvin Aus-
tin tweeted from a party in Miami.129  After an exploration of
Austin’s Twitter history, it became evident to the NCAA that recruit-
ing violations were occurring.130  The NCAA prompted an investi-
gation against UNC and sanctioned the school for failing to
effectively monitor Austin’s flagrant social media activity.131  Ulti-
mately, the investigation resulted with the suspension of thirteen
123. For a discussion of university justifications, see infra notes 160-171 and R
accompanying text.
124. See Hopkins, Hopkins & Whelton, supra note 11, at 13-14 (commenting R
that “NCAA has recommended that its member schools monitor the social media
of their athletes when concerns arise”).
125. See id. at 14 (noting NCAA’s imposition of restrictions on “electronic
communications” during student athlete recruitment process, yet failure to create
comprehensive student athlete social media policy).
126. See id. at 18 (stating that NCAA does not have absolute policy for its
member schools to follow in terms of social media regulation).
127. See id. (describing that while NCAA does not have its own policy, it relies
on member schools to conduct their own reviews).
128. See id. (discussing NCAA’s decision in enforcing social media restriction
against member school).
129. See Davis Walsh, Note, All A Twitter: Social Networking, College Athletes, and
the First Amendment, 20 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 619, 622 (2011) (describing back-
ground of Austin’s Twitter activity which raised suspicions from NCAA).
130. See id. at 622-23 (noting Austin’s Twitter presented evidence of attending
formal dinners and parties).
131. See id. at 623 (stating NCAA sanctions against UNC).
19
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players, a permanent dismissal of Austin from the team, and the
subsequent firing of coach Butch Davis.132
In sanctioning UNC, the NCAA did not capitalize on the op-
portunity to establish a clear social media monitoring policy for its
member institutions to follow.133  Consequently, collegiate athletic
programs continue to engage in varied forms of social media moni-
toring, regardless of whether these methods are potentially uncon-
stitutional.134  Though these online speech restrictions may in fact
be First Amendment violations, it is unlikely that student athletes
will bring suit.135  Because only a small percentage of college ath-
letes move on to the professional sporting realm, playing at the col-
legiate level may well be the last chance for most student athletes to
compete in a sport they love.136  In weighing the decision to bring
suit against an athletic department, students run the risk of “alienat-
ing teammates, coaches, and fans.”137  The glacial pace of litigation
is also a concern for student athletes wanting to bring suit.138  By
the time a final court decision is reached, the student athlete’s col-
lege athletic career will likely be over.139
2. Universities’ Policies Restricting Social Media Use
Without specified guidance, universities across the country
have adopted varying policies concerning the social media regula-
tion of their athletes.140  Many NCAA member schools hold, or
132. See id. (commenting on disciplinary effects of NCAA investigation).
133. See Hopkins, Hopkins & Whelton, supra note 11, at 18 (noting NCAA R
failing to establish uniform social media policy).
134. See id. at 19 (commenting on varied forms of social media restrictions).
135. See Marcus Hauer, Note, The Constitutionality of Public University Bans of
Student-Athlete Speech Through Social Media, 37 VT. L. REV. 413, 420 (2012) (asserting
that “if [student athletes are] forced to choose between their sport and free speech
rights, the speech rights lose”).
136. See id. (noting that 1 in 50 collegiate football players will receive opportu-
nity to play in NFL).
137. See id. at 420-21 (emphasizing student athletes’ burden of choice be-
tween fighting for their rights to free speech or readily complying with general
direction of their respective teams).
138. See id. (adding that even if lawsuit is victorious, student athletes’ col-
legiate careers will be over).
139. See id. at 421 (summarizing that in face of constitutional violations, stu-
dent athletes will likely choose compliance with school policy).
140. See Ken Paulson, Free Speech Sacks Ban on College-Athlete Tweets, USA TODAY
(Apr. 15, 2012, 6:27 AM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/opinion/fo-
rum/story/2012-04-15/twitter-social-media-college-sports-coaches-ban/54301178/
1 (providing examples of student athletes subject to repercussions due to violation
of their school’s social media restrictions).
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have held, full bans on student athletes’ usage of social media.141
The following schools have participated in fully banning their ath-
letes from using social: Boise State University, Mississippi State Uni-
versity, University of New Mexico, University of Miami, University of
South Carolina, University of Iowa, University of Kansas, University
of North Carolina, University of Las Vegas, Clemson University, Old
Dominion University, University of Missouri, and Kent State
University.142
Some schools, such as Boise State University, have forfeited
their outright bans on social media.143  Instead, they place heavy
guidelines and restrictions on what student athletes can and cannot
post on social media.144  Further, in addition to continually request-
ing that student athletes’ social media accounts be set to private
settings, Boise State mandates that its athletes provide a report of
social media usage to their Athletics Compliance office.145  Even
with these general guidelines, specific teams within the Boise State
program may ban participation from certain Web sites at the
coach’s discretion.146  Similarly, within the aftermath of UNC’s
NCAA investigation, the school updated its social media policy to
require that if student athletes make online statements that violate
NCAA or university rules, the school could take disciplinary mea-
sures.147  Instead of requiring student athletes to report on their
141. See id. (listing multiple schools whom have experimented with social me-
dia bans).
142. See generally Hopkins, Hopkins & Whelton, supra note 11, at 37-39; Pen- R
rose, supra note 114, at 519-20; Stubblefield, supra note 118, at 598. R
143. See Student Athlete Handbook, BOISE STATE UNIVERSITY DEP’T OF ATHLETICS,
available at https://s3.amazonaws.com/os_uploads/292945_BsuStudentAthlete-
Handbook2012-2013.pdf (last visited Feb. 4, 2014) (providing long list of guide-
lines student athletes must follow in regards to social media activity).
144. See id. (stating Boise State student athlete social media policy).
145. See id. (stating Boise State student athlete social media policy).
146. See id.  (allowing individual coaches to impose additional restrictions to
online activity of student athletes).  In 2010, Villanova University’s basketball team
took a similar hard stance on the subject of social media for its athletes. See Brian
Ewart, The Social Media Age at Villanova, VUHOOPS.COM (Jan. 25, 2012, 12:14 PM),
http://www.vuhoops.com/2012/01/25/social-media/ (noting social media ban of
Twitter and Facebook for Villanova’s basketball team).  Heralded by coach Jay
Wright, Wildcat basketball players were prohibited from utilizing Twitter and
Facebook, in efforts to shield players for the scrutiny of the public eye. See id.
(describing special media pressures student athletes face, in comparison to average
college students).
147. See Policy on Student Athlete Social Networking and Media Use, UNIVERSITY OF
NORTH CAROLINA AT CHAPEL HILL, available at http://cosida.com/media/docu-
ments/2012/9/UNC__Social_Media_Policy.pdf (last visited Mar. 14, 2014).
21
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social media activity, however, UNC hired a designated administra-
tor to monitor the content of student athletes’ social networking.148
In order to ensure the most thorough monitoring of the on-
line activity of its athletes, select schools have gone so far as to hire
third party companies to conduct sweeping analyses of their ath-
letes’ social media activity.149  Companies such as UDiligence, Var-
sity Monitor, and Central Social require student athletes of
participating schools to download their company software onto the
student’s computing device; once installed, the program scans the
social media activity of the student athletes.150  Then, the program
looks for specific trigger words that could convey an infraction of
student conduct guidelines—essentially anything that could assert
the “discussion of drug or alcohol use, obscenities, offensive com-
ments, or references to potential NCAA violations like agents or
free gifts.”151  Moreover, schools even tailor the specific trigger
words to more accurately reflect their particular code of athlete
conduct.152  Once an infraction is spotted, the online content is
flagged and submitted via e-mail to the university’s athletic
department.153
Such programs present glaring privacy issues for student ath-
letes.154  In order to install the program, students must disclose not
merely their usernames, but their passwords to ensure monitoring
around the clock.155  State legislatures have recognized this crass
opportunity for the infringement of privacy rights, and select states
have passed laws prohibiting higher education institutions from the
148. See id. (noting UNC’s decision to assign administrator tasked with moni-
toring student athletes’ social media accounts).
149. See John Browning, Universities Monitoring Social Media Accounts of Student-
Athletes: A Recipe for Disaster, 75 TEX. B.J. 840 (2012) (describing recent proclivity of
universities to hire social media monitoring companies in order to ensure student
athletes are complying with schools’ social media policies).
150. See id. at 842 (commenting that students are essentially forced to
download surveillance software).
151. See id. (noting that chief executive of Varsity Monitor stated that “[w]e
look for things that could damage the school’s brand and anything related to their
eligibility.”).
152. See id. (highlighting that schools can tailor range of activity monitored by
such companies).
153. See id. (describing procedure for monitoring of student athlete accounts
by third parties).
154. See Pete Thamel, Tracking Twitter, Raising Red Flags, NEW YORK TIMES
(Mar. 30, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/31/sports/universities-track-
athletes-online-raising-legal-concerns.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (stating that
third party monitoring of student athletes’ social media accounts can be an inva-
sion of privacy akin to “reading their mail or listening to their phone calls”).
155. See id. (emphasizing struggle between schools’ interest of compliance
with NCAA weighed against student athletes’ right to privacy).
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social media account monitoring of their athletes.156  Furthermore,
the University of Kentucky and the University of Louisville, both
users of third party monitoring software, faced much public scru-
tiny due to their list of trigger words.157  In addition to terms such
as “beer,” “keg,” and “ice,” the schools red flagged words such as
“Arab” and “Muslim.”158  Including such terms may demonstrate
that schools are not simply limiting potential reputational backlash,
but rather they are suppressing speech that may well relate to the
daily life of an athlete.159
3. University Justifications for Restricting Student Athletes’ Online
Speech
In the case of student athletes, universities, in particular, are
wary of the negative potential of social media—one negative tweet,
and student athletes could shed damaging light onto their educa-
tional institution.160  Thus, while their fellow classmates are free to
engage Internet speech, student athletes’ social media activity is in-
creasingly monitored and regulated by their respective athletic de-
partments to combat the potential for disrespectful online
activity.161
Universities cite to a variety of reasons for justifying their re-
striction on the speech of student athletes.162  The most commonly
cited concern is the fear of reputational damage to the institution
itself.163  Collegiate athletic programs are highly concerned with
maintaining good rapport with their fan base.164  Accordingly, the
156. See Browning, supra note 149, at 843 (stating that Maryland, Delaware, R
and California have passed legislation barring universities from infringing upon
privacy rights of their student athletes).
157. See id. (providing example of trigger word mishap with University of Ken-
tucky and University of Louisville).
158. See id. (giving examples of trigger words used by universities). See also
Hopkins, Hopkins & Whelton, supra note 11, at 39 (discussing trigger word situa- R
tion with University of Kentucky and University of Louisville).
159. See id. (noting true core of restriction hits heart of free speech rights).
160. See Mayer, supra note 119, at 457 (commenting that negative ways stu- R
dent athletes can utilize social media include “[using] it to make negative com-
ments about other players or students, to voice concerns with their playing time
and frustrations with their coach, or to get into detail about their personal lives,
usually by tweeting pictures.”).
161. See id. (stating need for monitoring social media of student athletes, as
such online accounts present direct reflections of school).
162. See Penrose, supra note 114, at 538 (beginning to describe reasons cited R
by schools to limit student athlete speech rights).
163. See id. (highlighting major concerns of schools when considering social
media usage by student athletes).
164. See id. (noting importance of institutional reputation in eyes of school’s
fan base).
23
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permanent nature of online activity is particularly worrisome to uni-
versities, as the inability to erase potentially offensive expression
presents a challenge to the ease of regulating a university’s
reputation.165
Turner Gill, head coach of the University of Kansas men’s foot-
ball team, stated the following reasoning for implementing a ban
on Twitter for his players: “The reason we decided to not allow our
players to have a Twitter account is we think it will prevent us from
being able to prepare our football program to move forward.  Sim-
ple as that.”166  This statement encapsulates two driving motivations
of schools for limiting the social media usage of its athletes.167
First, institutions demand that student athletes constantly present a
positive image of the schools and their programs.168  Second, the
statement reveals universities’ sheer willingness to censor student
athletes to achieve this goal, even by perhaps unconstitutional
methods.169  Fundamentally, the concerns held by higher educa-
tion institutions base themselves on a common premise—being a
student athlete is a privilege.170  Consequently, an examination of
collegiate athletic programs’ social media policies implies that stu-
dent speech is also considered a privilege.171
E. Professional Athlete Speech Restrictions
The influence of social media is certainly reflected in the field
of professional athletics.172  The accounts of sporting organizations
and individual athletes boast follower numbers in the millions; for
example, not only does the National Basketball Association possess
165. See id. at 539 (stating that rights of individual players would be violating
principles of “team unity, discipline, and on-field success”).
166. See Gay, supra note 107, at 797 (asserting that many coaches offer similar R
rationales when asked for reasoning behind restricting athlete social media use).
167. See id. (describing motivations that university officials possess when im-
plementing social media policies).  Additionally, universities have “a strong inter-
est in supporting policies that achieve on-field results at the expense of other
important values—like constitutionally protected student speech.” See id.
168. See id. (arguing importance of positive student athlete appearance).
169. See id. (noting measures implemented by higher education institutions to
ensure positive images of their student athletes).
170. See Penrose supra note 114, at 513-14 (noting that engaging in extracur- R
ricular activities, such as collegiate sport teams, is regarded as privilege).
171. See id. at 523-25 (arguing that student athletes “have long been held to
different standards” than non-athlete peers, and that social media usage should
not be exception).
172. See Irwin A. Kishner & Brooke E. Crescenti, The Rise of Social Media: What
Professional Teams and Clubs Should Consider, 27 ENT. & SPORTS LAW. 24, 24 (2010)
(“There is no doubt that sports have a significant presence in the social media
world.”).
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11.5 million followers on Twitter, but basketball star LeBron James
himself has a Twitter account catering to nearly 15.2 million follow-
ers.173  Many professional athletes flock to social media Web sites to
engage in an open communication outlet; such virtual platforms
not only create direct channels of communication with wide fan
bases, but they can also help establish an endorsement opportunity
to supplement athletes’ paychecks.174
Much like the higher educational institutions previously dis-
cussed, professional sporting organizations are wary of this unfet-
tered line of communication created by social media.175  Unlike
these higher education institutions, however, there is no First
Amendment freedom of speech guarantee to professional athletes
signed to play in these leagues.176  Consequently, in an effort to
curtail their organizations being cast in a negative light, the follow-
ing sport organizations have taken advantage of their discretion to
restrict speech, and have implemented restrictive social media
policies.177
173. See NBA (@NBA) on Twitter, TWITTER, https://twitter.com/NBA (last vis-
ited Oct. 2, 2014) (stating NBA’s follower count is approximately 11.5 million
users). See also Lebron James (@KingJames) on Twitter, TWITTER, https://twitter.com/
KingJames (last visited Oct. 2, 2014) (stating LeBron James’ follower count is ap-
proximate 15.2 million users).  Football players also possessed a multitude of Twit-
ter followers. See Chad Johnson (@Ochocinco) on Twitter, TWITTER, https://twitter
.com/ochocinco (last visited Oct. 2, 2014) (listing follower count of 3.61 million).
See also Reggie Bush (@ReggieBush) on Twitter, TWITTER, https://twitter.com/Reg-
gieBush (last visited Oct. 2, 2014) (listing follower count of 2.93 million).
174. See Pickering, supra note 8 (noting that some athletes, such as Shaquille R
O’Neal, utilize their social media presence to schedule “impromptu meet-ups with
fans”). See id. (commenting that in order to help athletes “build their personal
brand, . . . . [s]ome of the larger artist management firms and sports marketing
agencies have begun to embrace a more social strategy for their clients”).
175. See Judy Battista, The N.F.L. Has Identified the Enemy and It Is Twitter, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 4, 2009, at B13, available at  http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/04/
sports/football/04twitter.html (highlighting that football coaches are weary of
team information being leaked to public, as “the casual nature of Twitter could
inspire the budding bloggers in their locker rooms to inadvertently disclose more
than they should about injuries, game plans and what is said behind closed
doors.”). See also Kishner & Crescenti, supra note 172, at 25 (asserting that “all R
teams and clubs should enact policies to restrict players and personnel from dis-
paraging such teams’ and clubs’ sponsors, giving sponsors comfort that their brand
will be protected.”).
176. See Kishner & Crescenti, supra note 172, at 24-25 (“First Amendment pro- R
tections only apply when a restriction on speech is being imposed by a governmen-
tal agency, not a private organization.”).
177. For a discussion of the social media policies implemented by the Na-
tional Football League (NFL), National Basketball Association (NBA), and Na-
tional Hockey League (NHL), see infra notes 178-194 and accompanying text. R
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1. National Football League
In 2009, the National Football League (“NFL”) implemented
organization-wide social media restrictions against its players,
coaches, and operations personnel.178  The still-standing policy pro-
hibits use of social media from 90 minutes before a game is sched-
uled to kick-off until after the post-game media interviews.179
Individuals may not update any social media account during the
game or permit a third party to update the account.180  Thus, the
limitations place no restrictions on the content of the speech,
merely its timing in relation to officiated game times.181
Even after the organization-wide restrictions were established,
players still fumble over the guidelines.182  For example, in 2010,
Chad Johnson, then named Chad Ochocinco and playing as a wide
receiver for the Cincinnati Bengals, was slapped with a $25,000 fine
for tweeting within the prohibited time before a game.183
More recently, in an interesting overlap between the collegiate
and professional sporting spheres, the NFL Players Association
(“NFLPA”) signified the importance of educating top college re-
cruits in appropriate social media etiquette.184  Throughout the
weeklong Collegiate Bowl, held in January 2013, the NFLPA “made
it a priority to educate top prospects on the dangers of tweeting
their minds.”185  However, in a relaxation of its policies, the NFL
178. See League Announces Policy for Social Media for Before and After Games, NFL
(Aug. 31, 2009, 6:53 PM), http://www.nfl.com/news/story/09000d5d8124976d/
article/league-announces-policy-on-social-media-for-before-and-after-games  (not-
ing that before this general NFL policy was set, social media restrictions were at
discretion of individual teams).
179. See id. (stating restricted times for social media usage on game days).
180. See id. (prohibiting designated player representatives from updating
player’s social media accounts during games).
181. See Hughes, supra note 9 (opining that NFL’s policy is not particularly R
“rigid” toward content of athletes’ online speech).
182. See Maria Burns Ortiz, Guide to Leagues’ Social Media Policies, ESPN (Sept.
27, 2011), http://espn.go.com/espn/page2/story/_/id/7026246/examining-
sports-leagues-social-media-policies-offenders (providing examples of NFL players
breaching organizations’ social media policies).
183. See id. (stating that Ochocinco was fined for utilizing Twitter seventy-
seven minutes before preseason game against Philadelphia Eagles). See also ESPN
.com News Services, Chad Ochocinco Changes Last Name, ESPN NFL (July 24, 2012,
2:08AM), http://espn.go.com/nfl/story/_/id/8191660/chad-ochocinco-miami-
dolphins-says-last-name-johnson-again (reporting that Chad Johnson, in prepara-
tion for marrying Evelyn Lozada, formally changed his last name from Ochocinco
back to Johnson).
184. See Hughes, supra note 9 (describing NFLPA’s proactive role on inform- R
ing top NFL recruits of social media dangers).
185. See id. (lauding NFLPA for instructing NFL recruits to exercise caution in
online posting).
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encouraged athletes to utilize social media during the 2012 Pro
Bowl, citing a need to appease fans’ “ ‘insatiable appetite for
football.’”186
2. National Basketball Association
In similar stride to the NFL, the NBA established organization-
wide social media limitations in 2009.187  Akin to the NFL restric-
tions, the NBA prohibited the use of communication devices by
players, coaches, and operations personnel beginning 45 minutes
before a game until the completion of responsibilities after the
game.188
Additionally, unlike the NFL, the NBA has taken an affirmative
stance on fining athletes for the content of their online speech,
beyond time limit infractions.189  Mark Cuban, the notoriously col-
orful owner of the Dallas Mavericks, was fined  $50,000 by the NBA
for his negative Twitter comments, which disparaged league offici-
ating.190  New York Knicks player Amare Stoudemire was also fined
$50,000 for messaging anti-gay slurs to a fan.191
186. See NFL to Allow Players to Tweet During Pro Bowl, ESPN CHICAGO (Jan. 25,
2012, 7:35 PM), http://espn.go.com/chicago/nfl/story/_/id/7503314/nfl-allow-
players-tweet-pro-bowl (quoting NFL spokesman Brian McCarthy as stating “‘NFL
players have been very active on social media and enjoying [sic] talking to fans.
The nature of the Pro Bowl enables us to have players tweet during the game.’”).
187. See NBA Issues Policy on Twitter Use Before, After Games, NBA (Sept. 30, 2009,
11:28 PM), http://www.nba.com/2009/news/09/30/nba.twitter.rules.ap/ (re-
porting that NBA sent memo to teams concerning new social media policies for
league).
188. See id. (remarking that, in addition to policies described in memo, indi-
vidual teams may establish their own social media guidelines).
189. See Hughes, supra note 9 (recognizing that NBA athletes have been pun- R
ished for content of their speech, unlike NFL athletes).  By contrast, Tank Carder,
linebacker for the Cleveland Browns, was not punished under the NFL’s social
media policy for anti-gay remarks on Twitter. See id.
190. See Jeff Zillgitt, NBA Fines Mark Cuban $50,000 for Twitter Comments, USA
TODAY (Jan. 8, 2013, 8:10 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/nba/mav-
ericks/2013/01/08/dallas-mavericks-owner-mark-cuban-fined/1819001/  (report-
ing that Cuban’s impermissible Tweet stated “Im sorry NBA fans.  Ive tried for 13
years to fix the officiating in this league and I have failed miserably.  Any Sugges-
tions ?  I need help”).  Since becoming owner of the Mavericks in 2000, Cuban has
amassed over $2 million in fines from the NBA. See id.
191. See Melissa Rohlin, Amare Stoudemire Tweets Anti-Gay Slur to Fan, NBA Will
Review, L.A. TIMES (June 25, 2012, 11:39 AM), http://www.latimes.com/sports/
sportsnow/la-amare-stoudemire-tweets-gay-slur-to-fan-nba-will-review-20120625,0
,3287295.story#axzz2v9LcvbU2 (stating that Stoudemire directly messaged to fan
anti-gay slurs and obscene language via Twitter). See also Hughes, supra note 9 R
(reporting final fine amount was $50,000).
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3. National Hockey League
In 2011, social media restrictions were etched into the ice.192
After extensive discussions with the National Hockey League
Player’s Association (NHLPA), the National Hockey League (NHL)
instituted “blackout periods” on game days, in which players are
restricted from social media use two hours prior to a game and un-
til post-game obligations have been fulfilled.193  The league ex-
pressly noted, however, that the opportunity for disciplinary
measures could still arise if such online statements “have or are de-
signed to have an effect prejudicial to the welfare of the League,
the game of hockey or a member club, or are publicly critical of
officiating staff.”194  Thus, the social media policy is effectively two
pronged: first, it declares required blackout periods, and second, it
suggests ways for “proper” social media usage.195
IV. HALTING THE HASHTAGS: ANALYZING THE
UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATE UNIVERSITIES’
RESTRICTIONS ON STUDENT ATHLETE
ONLINE SPEECH
“[I]f there is any principle of the Constitution that more impera-
tively calls for attachment than any other it is the principle of
free thought—not free thought for those who agree with us but
freedom for the thought that we hate.”196
Universities that establish online speech restrictions must rec-
ognize the First Amendment rights of student athletes.197  This Part
will analyze the constitutionality of two main categories of restric-
tions that universities have established: full bans of social media and
192. See NHL Institutes New Social Media Policy, NHL (Sept. 15, 2011, 12:00
PM), http://www.nhl.com/ice/news.htm?id=588534 (reporting that NHL policy
established social media restrictions for its participants).
193. See id. (noting social media time restrictions on game day).
194. See id. (commenting on possibility of discipline as response to inappro-
priate online conduct).
195. See Greg Wyshynski, Inside the NHL’s New Social Media Policy for Players,
YAHOO! SPORTS (Sept. 15, 2011, 2:05 PM), http://sports.yahoo.com/nhl/blog/
puck_daddy/post/Inside-the-NHL-s-new-social-media-policy-for-pla?urn=nhl-
wp12624 (describing dual-nature of NHL social media restrictions).
196. United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 654-55 (1929) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting) (emphasizing sheer importance of respecting all forms of opinion in
context of First Amendment).
197. See generally Walsh, supra note 129, at 619 (highlighting need to recog- R
nize student athlete First Amendment rights).
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restricted use.198  After analyzing the constitutionality of such re-
strictions, this Part concludes by recommending the best course of
action for universities to follow.199
A. Full Social Media Bans are Unconstitutional Violations
of Prior Restraint
As mentioned in Part III, the doctrine of prior restraint refers
to governmental action that aims to suppress the opportunity of
speech before it occurs, rather than its resulting effects.200  When
collegiate athletic programs establish full bans on social media,
prior restraint issues are raised because teams are attempting to
prohibit speech before the speech has even commenced.201
Universities hold the burden of proving that their speech limi-
tations are constitutionally permissible when those limitations com-
pletely ban student athletes from using social media.202  In order
for universities to successfully defend their restrictive policies, they
must meet four conditions.203  First, the restrictions cannot allocate
broad powers to the institution.204  Second, any restrictions that
aim to limit the time, place, and manner of student athletes’ speech
cannot be based on the content of the speech.205  Third, the restric-
tions must be narrowly tailored enough to promote a significant
198. For a discussion of ways universities limit student athletes’ social media
expression, see infra notes 199-258 and accompanying text. R
199. For a discussion of recommendations for universities when creating their
social media policy for athletes, see infra notes 259-271 and accompanying text. R
200. See Redish, supra note 46, at 53 (providing definition for prior restraint). R
201. See Stubblefield, supra note 118, at 597 (2012) (highlighting that prior R
restraint is seen as “a ban of social media restrict[ing] all speech made in that
forum, both protected and unprotected”).
202. See Carroll v. Pres. & Comm’rs of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 181
(1968) (emphasizing severity of prior restraint by affirming that “[p]rior restraint
upon speech suppresses the precise freedom which the First Amendment sought
to protect against abridgement”).
203. See Forsyth Cnty. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 130 (1992) (list-
ing four factors, that if properly adhered, will permit government to limit speech
before it occurs). See also Carroll, 393 U.S. at 181 (holding that “prior restraints
upon expression ‘avoids constitutional infirmity only if it takes place under proce-
dural safeguards designed to obviate the dangers of a censorship system.’” (quot-
ing Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58 (1965))).
204. See Forsyth, 505 U.S. at 127, 130, 132-33 (noting importance of govern-
ment scheme not to allocate administrative officials with too much power to deter-
mine impermissibility of certain speech).
205. See id. at 134-37 (prohibiting government from pre-emptively enacting
content based restrictions).
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state interest.206  Last, the restriction needs to “leave open ample
alternatives for communication.”207
When universities completely ban the use of social media, the
first two prongs of this analysis can be easily met.208  However, in
regards to the first prong, educational institutions must be careful
not to allocate themselves too much authority when constructing
social media policies.209  Deciding to entirely ban social networking
use sharply decreases schools’ power and discretion, because
schools are prohibiting student athletes from participating in the
speech entirely, and not arbitrarily deciding its permissibility.210
Universities can readily pass the second prong, as well, when
they choose to apply a blanket ban to social media.211  With the
imposition of a complete ban, schools are not restricting the con-
tent of student athletes’ speech, but rather their ultimate usage.212
Consequently, social media bans cannot be construed as content-
based restrictions on speech, but rather content neutral time, place,
and manner restrictions on speech.213
However, the third and fourth prongs raise a difficult standard
for schools banning social media.214  In regard to the third prong,
the restriction must be narrowly tailored and must be in further-
ance of a significant state interest.215  An overall ban on social me-
dia is, by no means, a narrowly tailored restriction; schools are
intending to blockade online speech on the broadest possible
206. See id. at 130 (stating that content-neutral time, place, and manner re-
strictions must be “narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest.”).
207. See id.
208. See Stubblefield, supra note 118, at 598 (noting state universities will face R
little difficulty in successfully asserting that complete bans on social media do not
confer broad, discretionary authority to school officials and such bans are not in-
dicative of content based restrictions on speech).
209. See id. at 597 (stating government officials may not be granted broad
discretion in their implementation of speech restriction).
210. See Forsyth, 505 U.S. at 132-33 (examining whether administrators were
forced to examine objective standards or guidelines when choosing to limit
speech).
211. See Stubblefield, supra note 118, at 598 (arguing that when universities R
enact overall bans on social networking, they can readily prove its validity).
212. See id. at 600 (positing that universities can argue that full social media
bans do not limit content of speech, but forum in which speech would occur).
213. See id. (noting that social media bans are limit on manner of speech, and
student athletes are still free to engage in traditional speech methods).
214. See id. 598 (asserting that universities will fail to prove that full social
media bans are narrowly tailored and result in ample alternative communication
channels).
215. See Forsyth, 505 U.S. at 130 (asserting that prior restraint may be permis-
sible if content neutral restrictions pass intermediate scrutiny).
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level.216  Further, universities have not yet provided a significant
enough interest to justify their restriction on student athlete
speech.217  As previously mentioned, universities assert that limiting
student athletes’ online speech is significant to uphold the reputa-
tion of educational institutions and to limit the opportunity for a
school’s brand to be tarnished by potential offensiveness.218
However, when deciding on Internet censorship, the Supreme
Court did not even find the restriction of child pornography to be a
compelling enough reason to uphold the constitutional validity of a
congressional act.219  Even in light of an issue as sensitive as child
pornography, the Supreme Court declined to impose censorship
over the Internet due to the challenged law’s overbroad terms.220
In comparison, universities certainly cannot solely cite to potential
reputational damage as a basis to fully ban student athletes’ online
speech.221  Such bans are similarly overbroad, and therefore fail the
third prong of prior restraint analysis.222
In regards to the fourth prong, universities do not leave oppor-
tunities for alternative communication when they choose to ban
student athletes’ use of social media.223  This statement would still
be true even if a university limited the ban to one social media Web
216. See Bentley, supra note 104, at 460 (asserting that full bans on social me- R
dia restrict unnecessary amount of student athlete speech).  If universities entirely
restrict the social media of student athletes, not only will student athletes be una-
ble to comment about an upcoming game, but they are also unable to virtually
voice their ideas and thoughts unrelated to their athletic program. See id. (high-
lighting that total bans on social media suppress all forms of speech and are conse-
quently not narrowly tailored).
217. See Stubblefield, supra note 118, at 598 (arguing that even if schools R
point to protecting “the health, safety, and morals” of student athletes as justifica-
tion for pre-emptively restricting their speech, student athletes may still incur
harm, for example, if student athlete “misuses the forum and suffers the repercus-
sions of those actions”).
218. For an in-depth discussion of university justifications for limiting student
athletes’ social media usage, see supra notes 160-171 and accompanying text. R
219. See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 252-53 (2002) (as-
serting that “[t]he mere tendency of speech to encourage unlawful acts is not a
sufficient reason for banning [speech]”).
220. See id. at 258 (holding CPPA provisions as overbroad, and thus unconsti-
tutional).  In its decision, the Court noted that the congressional act was not only
directed to obscene, unprotected speech, but reaches beyond obscenity to target
any speech of a sexual nature. See id. at 240 (explaining CPPA’s overbroad
provisions).
221. See Stubblefield, supra note 118, at 598-99 (arguing that full social media R
bans are not narrowly tailored to achieve universities’ interest because such com-
plete bans restrict more speech than necessary).
222. See generally Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 252 (describing CPPA’s lack
of narrow tailoring leading to its overbreadth).
223. See Stubblefield, supra note 118, at 598 (proclaiming that “[s]ocial media R
offers a unique avenue of expression, and a court could determine that social me-
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site, such as Twitter or Facebook.224  Though social media Web sites
can be quickly lumped together, each social media Web site is a
separate platform, designed for a particularized use.225  By banning
athletes from Twitter, there exists no other opportunity for an ath-
lete to “tweet”—i.e., send 140- character-driven communications to
friends, family members, and fans.226  Thus, student athletes’
speech rights are restricted without availability for an alternative, as
no other social media platform is designed to effect communica-
tion the same manner as Twitter.227  Therefore, a ban on student
athletes’ social media usage violates the fourth prong of prior re-
straint, as the specialized nature of social media Web sites leave no
room for alternative communications.228
Ultimately, when universities decide to enforce a ban on stu-
dent athletes’ usage of social media, the ban will fail prior restraint
analysis, due to its shortcomings relative to the third and fourth
prongs.229
B. “Limited-Use” Policies on Social Media Are Unconstitutional
Content-Based Restrictions
Instead of implementing outright bans on social media usage,
universities such as Boise State and UNC have placed restrictions
on the content of student athletes’ speech in social media.230
dia is the only means by which a student athlete can communicate at-will with the
public at large.”).
224. See Mayer, supra note 119, at 463 (discussing issue of prior restraint even R
as applied to one particular social media platform).
225. See Eric Ravenscraft, Which Social Network Should I Use?, LIFEHACKER (Aug.
07, 2013, 10:00 AM), http://lifehacker.com/which-social-network-should-i-use-
894808717 (describing various social media Web sites’ differing purposes and us-
age opportunities).
226. See Mayer, supra note 119, at 463 (declaring that “[i]f schools completely R
ban Twitter usage, they could be imposing a prior restraint as the schools would be
restricting all speech made in that forum and not just a particular type of
speech.”).
227. See Carlson, supra note 32 (highlighting unique features associated with R
Twitter).
228. See Eileen Bernardo, The Unique Benefits of Each Social Platform,
IMEDIACONNECTION (Feb. 19, 2013), http://www.imediaconnection.com/con-
tent/33619.asp (describing particularized advantages associated with specific social
media Web sites).
229. See Stubblefield, supra note 118, at 598 (asserting that full bans on social R
media are not narrowly tailored enough to support universities’ interest in restrict-
ing speech, and such bans leave no alternative channel for online speech).
230. See Boise State Student Athlete Handbook, supra note 143 (disclosing Boise R
State’s social media restrictions for its collegiate athletes); UNC Social Media Policy,
supra note 147 (revealing UNC updated policy toward social networking for stu- R
dent athletes).
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Though these restrictions do not entirely ban the use of social
networking, the policies can be unconstitutional as content-based
restrictions due to their restriction of the actual content of student
athletes’ speech.231
Accordingly, the social media policies are presumptively inva-
lid, and universities face a heavy burden to prove that their online
speech restrictions are the least-restrictive, narrowly tailored
method to effectively serve their compelling interest.232
Under strict scrutiny analysis, such social media restrictions are
not narrowly tailored.233  For example, Boise State’s social media
policy broadly prohibits the use of “offensive language” in all online
activity of student athletes.234  This general prohibition contains no
specification or examples as to what precisely constitutes “offen-
sive.”235  Accordingly, restrictive social media policies utilizing
broad language in their limitation of speech are impermissible, as
the broad language suppresses protected speech.236  This chilling
effect of online speech is far too great a burden upon student ath-
letes’ right to free speech.237  Due to these policies’ broad struc-
ture, the limitations upon online speech are also not created in the
least restrictive manner possible.238
231. See Police Dep’t of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (establish-
ing that speech restrictions based on content of speech are unconstitutional).
232. See United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 815 (2000)
(stating content based restrictions must undergo strict scrutiny because such re-
strictions burden content of speech).
233. See Walsh, supra note 129, at 642 (asserting that UNC’s updated policy is R
content based restriction subject to strict scrutiny, as policy targets speech’s
content).
234. See Boise State Student Athlete Handbook, supra note 143 (providing example R
of prohibited online speech for student athletes).
235. See id. (lacking in establishing standards for what constitutes offensive).
236. See Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 871 (1997) (holding
that without definitions, statutory language could lead to speaker uncertainty).
The ability to effect uncertainty in speakers indicates that the regulation itself pos-
sesses vagueness issues. See id. at 871-72 (stressing that vagueness of law leads to
“obvious” chilling of speech).
237. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Making Sense of Overbreadth, 100 YALE L.J. 853,
867 (1991) (postulating that “[a]ny substantial ‘chilling’ of constitutionally pro-
tected expression is intolerable.”).
238. See Reno, 521 U.S. at 879 (describing that government has burden to
prove less restrictive alternative to speech limitation would not be effective
method).  When a regulation is vast in breadth, it is clearly not narrowly tailored to
achieve government goals, and thus courts will favor less restrictive speech policies.
See id. at 882 (analogizing situation to “burn[ing] the house to roast the pig” (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted) (citing Sable Communications of California, Inc.
v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 127 (1989))).
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Further, universities have failed to establish a compelling inter-
est as a justification for their restrictions.239  Boise State specifically
refers to maintaining the reputation of the institution as a factor for
limiting student athletes’ online speech.240  However, a desire to
shield fans from potentially offensive language or content is by no
means an appropriate justification for limiting student athletes’
fundamental right to free speech.241  As the Supreme Court held in
Playboy Entertainment, “the Constitution exists precisely so that opin-
ions and judgments . . .  can be formed, tested, and expressed.
What the Constitution says is that . . .  judgments are for the individ-
ual to make, not for the Government to decree, even with the man-
date or approval of a majority.”242  The Court noted that
“[t]echnology expands the capacity to choose; and it denies the po-
tential of this revolution if we assume the Government is best posi-
tioned to make these choices for us.”243  Thus, the advent of
technology encourages the public discourse idealized by the Consti-
tution, and universities cannot interject their own judgments at the
cost of suppressing student athletes’ rightful expression.244
Additionally, the Tinker Court held that schools may not pro-
hibit student speech because of mere apprehensions of distur-
bances.245  Disregarding this principle, state universities implement
restrictive online speech guidelines from precisely the “apprehen-
sion” of disturbance Tinker warns against.246  There is a harrowing
239. For a discussion of inadequate justifications of university enacted social
media policies, see supra notes 160-171 and accompanying text. R
240. See Boise State Student Athlete Handbook, supra note 143 (describing reason- R
ing for enacting social media limitations).
241. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 415 (1989) (“If there is any fixed star
in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe
what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opin-
ion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.” (citing West
Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943))).
242. United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 818 (2000)
(highlighting importance of individuals’ ability to formulate personal opinions,
without extraneous interference by government).
243. Id. (stressing that advent of technology heightens “capacity” for individ-
ual to engage in decision-making process, and government should particularly take
steps to detangle involvement in digital sphere).
244. See id. (positing that “were we to give the [g]overnment the benefit of
the doubt when it attempted to restrict speech, we would risk leaving regulations
in place that sought to shape our unique personalities or to silence dissenting
ideas.”).
245. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509
(1969) (holding that schools must have greater “than a mere desire to avoid the
discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint”
when implementing restrictions upon student speech).
246. See Gay, supra note 107, at 797-98 (providing reasoning for universities R
restricting speech on fear of future repercussions).
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lack of evidence pointing to the notion that a student athlete’s neg-
ative online social activity will directly result in a disturbance within
a school.247  Thus, schools fail the Tinker analysis when they imple-
ment restrictive policies towards student athletes’ online speech.248
In response to the above assertions, universities will presuma-
bly argue against the contention that that their restrictions on so-
cial media are based upon the central content of student athlete
speech.249  Instead, schools will likely assert that these limitations
are created in regards to controlling the secondary effects of stu-
dent athletes’ online speech.250  By framing their restrictions as be-
ing cultivated through secondary effects, universities may attempt
to categorize their ban as a content-neutral restriction on speech.251
If the limitations are classified as content-neutral, universities’ so-
cial media policies will no longer face a presumption of invalidity
and universities will be met with a lesser burden of justifying the
constitutionality of their speech restrictions.252
Although universities may want to utilize the secondary effects
doctrine to circumvent the legal rigidity associated with content-
based restrictions, an examination of social media policies for stu-
dent athletes’ online speech reveal that the limitations are far from
founded upon secondary effects concerns.253  As previously dis-
cussed, speech restrictions formulated on secondary effects impose
limitations without regard to the content of speech; instead, secon-
247. See id. (leaving direct, impactful disturbances to athletic programs absent
list of justifications for restriction student athlete speech).
248. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514 (examining record to establish factors leading
to plausible substantial disruption within school from speech, but failing to find
evidence).
249. See Stubblefield, supra note 118, at 597 (asserting universities would de- R
fend themselves based on time, place, or manner restrictions).
250. See Penrose, supra note 114, at 527-28 (discussing universities’ considera- R
tions when implementing social media policies).  Universities could assert that in
the grand scheme of collegiate athletics, the legacy of the individual athlete will
eventually be overshadowed by the “enduring nature of the university.” See id. at
527 (arguing that individual athletes could never be “larger than the legendary”
statuses of major universities across United States).  Thus, when establishing
speech restrictions, universities could argue that they are basing limitation on
maintenance of long-standing reputation. See id. (noting that majority of col-
legiate sport fans “are more tied to the lasting nature of the institution rather than
the fleeting nature of the college athlete”).
251. See Boos v. Berry, 485 U.S. 312, 320 (1988) (denying respondent’s argu-
ment for content neutral speech classification under secondary effects doctrine).
252. See Huhn, supra note 57, at 805-06 (noting intermediate scrutiny is R
proper analysis for content neutral restrictions).
253. See City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47 (1986) (de-
termining secondary effects by examining effects on prohibiting adult theaters al-
together, but not by individual content of adult films).
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dary effects justifications assert that the restriction is designed to
influence external factors unrelated to speech.254
Regardless, when universities limit their student athletes’
speech based on a fear of reputational damage, they fail to muster
support for the secondary effects doctrine.255  The Supreme Court
has repeatedly held that the fear of audience offensiveness is not a
proper example of a speech restriction’s secondary effects.256  Con-
versely, crafting speech limitations to minimize an audience’s reac-
tion is seen as targeting the primary effects of speech, and thus
triggers a content-based restriction analysis.257
Accordingly, universities will likely fail at their attempt to cate-
gorize their restrictive social media policies as content-neutral re-
strictions, as their limitations restrict the primary effects of
speech.258  Further, when universities implement policies restrict-
ing social media usage to broad factors, such as “offense,” the limi-
tations represent unconstitutional content-based restrictions upon
speech as they suppress more speech than necessary.259
C. Recommendation
While universities’ restrictions on the social media activity of
their student athletes are unconstitutional, this finding does not en-
tirely render an athletic department powerless in terms of monitor-
ing the online activity of student athletes.260  If universities truly
desire a formal social media policy for student athletes, universities
254. See id. at 48-49 (noting that ordinance banning adult theaters fit within
central concern of ensuring that government cannot grant forum use for accept-
able views but deny use for less favored views).
255. See Boos, 485 U.S. at 320 (upholding Renton decision because government
concern of secondary effects of speech truly did not correlate with speech’s con-
tent).  However, the Boos Court draws a distinction between secondary effects and
laws that focus on the “direct impact” of speech to audience. See id. at 321 (deny-
ing audience reaction to speech as example of secondary effects).
256. See id. (holding that government’s justification of protecting dignity of
foreign diplomats was not proper example of secondary effects as it was far too
subjective). See also Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 49, 56 (1988) (as-
serting that citizens must tolerate offensive speech within public debate in order to
allocate “adequate breathing space” to First Amendment freedoms).
257. See Boos, 485 U.S. at 321 (stating that because provision targeted speech
content, it is classified as content based restriction).
258. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 412 (1989) (applying Boos analysis of
content based restrictions to flag burning).
259. See Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 885 (1997) (declin-
ing Internet censorship because congressional act’s overbreadth would negatively
impact “exchange of ideas”).
260. See Bentley, supra note 104, at 458-64 (providing list of tips universities R
could follow to permissibly monitor student athlete online activity).
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could implement time, place, or manner restrictions.261  Such re-
strictions would be considered content-neutral, and if effectively
constructed, would be constitutional limitations on speech.262
Furthermore, there are far less First Amendment-intrusive
methods universities may take if they wish to curb student athletes’
potentially distasteful social media activity.263  For example, univer-
sities could take the proactive approach of educating student ath-
letes of the dangers associated with social media.264  This approach
is similar to the NFLPA’s actions at the Collegiate Bowl.265  If
schools themselves began conducting formal education sessions on
the possible negative effects of social media, student athletes are
likely to be more knowledgeable about their virtual footprint and
take their decision to post online more seriously.266
261. See id. (arguing beneficial aspects of content-neutral restrictions from
university prospective).
262. See id. (highlighting that content-neutral restrictions provide easier
benchmarks for limitations of speech).
263. See Vicki Blohm, The Future of Social Media Policy in the NCAA, 3 HARV. J.
SPORTS & ENT. L. 277, 294 (2012) (arguing that NCAA should lift policy requiring
social media monitoring to better reflect “hands off” approach present in non-
sporting world).  Without restrictions, student athletes’ online speech is entirely
within their discretion, much like average citizens. See id. (asserting that student
athletes “must be given an opportunity to learn that nothing done on the internet
is private, and actions have real repercussions in the media, from future employ-
ers, or with graduate school admissions officers.”).
264. See Hauer, supra note 135, at 434 (recommending that educational ap- R
proach would help ease school officials’ fear of social media misuse).  By formally
educating athletes on social media, student athletes can learn how to effectively
block threatening posts and set appropriate privacy settings on their accounts. See
id. (suggesting universities should utilize real world examples of social media mis-
haps to put issue in perspective for students). See also Browning, supra note 149, at R
842 (“[C]olleges and universities concerned about social media fallout would be
better advised to do what they do best: educate.  Schools can and should teach
their student athletes about the dangers of misusing social media, thereby protect-
ing their brands while refraining from invasive, legally-dubious conduct.”).
265. See Hughes, supra note 9 (showcasing NFL’s concentrated efforts to ad- R
dress social media awareness at early stage of athletes’ careers). See also Bill Speros,
NFL Rookies Still Adjusting to Social Media, ESPN (May 14, 2013, 2:00 PM), http://
espn.go.com/blog/playbook/trending/post/_/id/16881/nfl-rookies-still-adjust-
ing-to-social-media (providing examples of young NFL players whose careers have
been shaped negatively or positively by social media).
266. See Allie Grasgreen, Tweet Smart, Tweet Often, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Aug. 20,
2013), http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2013/08/20/instead-telling-ath-
letes-not-tweet-colgate-shows-how-social-media-can-work-them (describing how Col-
gate University provides student athletes with formal class on social media perils).
In these sessions, Colgate stresses to student athletes that their online activity is
their personal brand, and students should proactively take charge of positively
branding themselves in the media. See id. (recommending that student athletes set
personal goals for their online social networking). See also Hauer, supra note 135, R
at 435 (stressing that universities should emphasize lasting impact social media
catastrophes can have on individual’s athletic career).
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Additionally, schools could request that student athletes in-
clude a disclaimer on their public profiles.267  Such disclaimers
could be a one-sentence statement expressing that the views of the
profile reflect those of the account holder, not the educational in-
stitution.268  Hence, disclaimers provide a layer of protection to
schools’ reputations, as disclaimers distance schools from the spe-
cific views of each individual student athlete.269
Currently, universities are exercising nearly free-reign in creat-
ing social media restrictions for student athletes.270  And while stu-
dent athletes are unlikely to file lawsuits, universities should neither
take advantage of student athletes’ silence nor impose it.271  By im-
plementing less intrusive measure—such as non-content based limi-
tations, education, and disclaimers—universities can respect the
free speech rights of student athletes and also protect their institu-
tional interests.272
V. TO POST, OR NOT TO POST?  THAT IS THE QUESTION:
EVALUATING PROFESSIONAL SPORT LEAGUES’
RESTRICTIONS ON SOCIAL MEDIA
“If liberty means anything at all, it means the right to tell
people what they don’t want to hear.”273
Professional sporting organizations are private entities, not
state actors, and thus they can infringe on professional athletes’
right to speech without being subject to First Amendment liabil-
267. See Jaia A. Thomas, My Coach Won’t Let Me Twitter? Understanding the Legal
Implications of Social Media On and Off the Field, 28 ENT. & SPORTS LAW 18, 19 (2010)
(arguing for use of disclaimer on social media accounts).
268. See id. (stating that sample disclaimer statement could be as follows: “The
views and ideas expressed on this Twitter account do not express the views and
ideas of the [organization] and its affiliate companies.”).
269. See id. (positing that disclaimer could provide “extra coating” from liabil-
ity between leagues and views of individual athletes).
270. For a discussion of the varying types of social media restrictions universi-
ties have implemented against student athletes, see sources cited supra notes 124- R
159 and accompanying text. R
271. See Hauer, supra note 135, at 421 (noting universities are unlikely targets R
of First Amendment lawsuits in this situation, as student athletes are improbable
plaintiffs).
272. See Bentley, supra note 104, at 458-75 (providing three main “best prac- R
tices” tips for universities: (1) refrain from non-content based bans of social media,
(2) utilize “reasonable restrictions” on social media and educate student athletes
on social media repercussions, and (3) evaluate inappropriate social media con-
duct by special circumstances of each situation).
273. See Freedom and Liberty Quotes, TENTMAKER, http://www.tentmaker.org/
Quotes/freedom_liberty_quotes6.htm (last visited Sept. 10, 2014).
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ity.274  Even though sports organizations are not encumbered by
First Amendment liability, leagues are still free to implement social
media policies that are less intrusive on athletes’ autonomy.275  For
example, organizations could take note of the NFL’s allowance of
social media for special events such as the Pro Bowl.276  By lifting
the time prohibitions of online activity for a particularized event,
the NFL is acknowledging the sheer significance social media and
social media’s ability to connect players with fans in a positive man-
ner.277  If other leagues implement similar stances for specialized
games, they could receive reputational boosts from the promotion
of interconnectedness between the field and fans.278
Furthermore, the time limit ban prohibiting social media post-
ings until after a game has been completed is, essentially, meaning-
less.279  League guidelines direct that players are required to spend
a portion of their post-game time in interviews with the media and
generally interacting with the press.280  However, this press require-
ment is not altogether different from players posting statements to
274. See Michael Dolgow, Where Free Speech Goes to Die: the Workplace, BUSINESS-
WEEK (Aug. 3, 2012), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-08-03/where-
free-speech-goes-to-die-the-workplace (describing that private employers are free
to limit their employees’ freedom of speech).
275. See Frank LoMonte, College Sports and Social Media: Leave Your Rights in the
Locker Room?, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION (Apr. 21, 2014), http://
apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/civil/articles/spring2014-0514-col-
lege-sports-social-media-leave-your-rights-locker-room.html (asserting that al-
though employers can establish contractual relationships to limit rights of
employees, this may not be most appropriate course of action).
276. See NFL Will Allow Players to Tweet During Pro Bowl, supra note 185. R
277. See Kevin Nogle, Pro Bowl 2013: NFL Again Sets Up Twitter Hubs on Sidelines,
THE PHINSIDER (Jan. 27, 2013, 1:42 PM), http://www.thephinsider.com/2013/1/
27/3921698/pro-bowl-2013-nfl-again-sets-up-twitter-hubs-on-sidelines (reporting
that NFL continued to lift its social media restrictions at 2013 Pro Bowl).
278. See David Cattai, Best Twitter Reactions to NFL Pro Bowl, BLEACHER REPORT
(Jan. 28, 2014), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/1937856-best-twitter-reac-
tions-to-nfl-pro-bowl (compiling list of Pro Bowl players’ top social media interac-
tions after intensive game).  Players received thousands of “retweets” from
supporting fans, and 2014 Pro Bowl was viewed by over 11 million people. See id.
(declaring game as “most-watched all-star game out of the major sports”).
279. See Joe Librizzi, Why the NFL and NBA’s Twitter and Social Media Policy is
Wrong, BLEACHER REPORT (Dec. 20, 2009), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/
311770-why-twitter-and-social-media-policy-in-nfl-and-nba-is-wrong (questioning re-
strictions on post-game social media usage due to social media’s similar structure
to post-game interviews).
280. See 2014 NFL Media Policy, PRO FOOTBALL WRITERS OF AMERICA, http://
www.profootballwriters.org/nfl-media-policy/ (last visited Mar. 4, 2014) (stating
that football players must make themselves accessible to media after every game).
See also NBA Revises Media Policy for Players, Coaches, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Sept. 20
2013, 2:47 PM), http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/nba/news/20130920/nba-revis-
ing-media-policy-tom-frank/ (remarking that NBA requires athletes to avail them-
selves to media fifteen minutes before and after game).
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their social media accounts.281  Anything a player might tweet could
easily be said in a post-game interview.282
Therefore, if sports leagues are genuinely interested in dimin-
ishing the negative publicity athletes can generate through their
online speech, professional sports organizations should focus more
on educating their athletes on social media usage, as opposed to
implementing vapid bans on athlete postings.283  Leagues should
ensure that professional athletes are extremely cognizant of the far-
reaching effects of social networking.284  Social media allows fans to
no longer be in the backseat of their favorite players’ ride to victory;
social media provides for a direct, two-way channel of communica-
tion that gives fans a clear line of communication to players.285
Consequently, professional athletes should be highly mindful of the
fact that this communication can quickly turn from friendly to
ferocious.286
In light of social media’s mercurial nature, a simple time limit
ban is not the most effective way to deter athletes from making of-
fensive postings.287  Thus, sports organizations or individual profes-
sional teams should take a meditated approach to educating
athletes on the reaching effects of online speech in order for ath-
letes to learn the consequences of pushing the send button.288  A
281. See Chris Greenberg, Richard Sherman’s Rant May Have ‘Scared Erin An-
drews,’ Definitely Bothered Some on Twitter, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 20, 2014, 12:04
AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/01/20/richard-sherman-rant-erin-an-
drews_n_4629510.html (explaining how Seattle Seahawks cornerback Richard
Sherman aggressively spoke with sports broadcaster Erin Andrews after victory
against San Francisco 49ers).  When Andrews attempted to interview Sherman af-
ter the victory, Sherman shouted “Don’t you ever talk about me” and “Don’t you
open your mouth about the best, or I’ll shut it up for you real quick.” See id.
(providing Sherman’s statements in regards to 49ers wide receiver Michael
Crabtree).
282. See id. (stating that post-game social media bans represent hollow at-
tempt at curbing professional athletes’ online speech).
283. See Lauren McCoy, 140 Characters or Less: Maintaining Privacy and Publicity
in the Age of Social Networking, 21 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 203, 215-16 (2010) (empha-
sizing importance of athlete awareness in scope of their online activity).
284. See id. at 217 (remarking that “[t]he biggest problem with social network-
ing is that few are truly cognizant of its reaches, and focusing on social networking
usage during games will do little to curb this effect.”).
285. See Kishner & Crescenti, supra note 172, at 25 (arguing that social media R
has turned sports fans from casual observers to active participants and reshapes
communication between athletes and fans as dialogues).
286. See id. (remarking that negative commentary can be natural result of
open dialogue).
287. See McCoy, supra note 279, at 217 (asserting that athletes can readily en- R
gage in offensive online conduct after time restrictions are over).
288. See id. at 216 (highlighting need for league “in-depth policy” to mitigate
social media disasters).
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time limit ban will simply restrict athletes’ speech for short periods
of time on game day—once that limit passes, there is nothing to
curb athletes from garnering negative attention for their social
networking.289  However, the educational approach will impart
knowledge about online activity that is applicable to all days of the
year, and will ultimately enable athletes to use social media in a
smarter, more sensible fashion.290
VI. CONCLUSION
Universities and sports organizations are increasingly imple-
menting measures to restrict how their athletes use social media.
This restrictive attitude may conflict with the First Amendment,
which protects the fundamental right to freedom of speech.  Conse-
quently, when public higher education institutions restrict their stu-
dent athletes’ usage of social media, universities are likely
unconstitutionally infringing on their student athletes’ right to free-
dom of speech.  Although professional, private sports leagues are
not bound by the provisions of the First Amendment, their restric-
tions upon athletes’ utilization of social media is detrimental to the
connectivity and growth social media can provide to athletes.  Ulti-
mately, the best course of action for both universities and sports
organizations alike, would be to adopt the least restrictive social me-
dia policies, while also educating athletes about the consequences
and effects of online speech.
Tehrim Umar*
289. See id. at 217 (asserting that “[s]imply banning use of these sites will not
solve any problems; instead athletes, like everyone else, need to learn how to use
these sites in a professional manner that protects their privacy and maintains the
reputation of the organizations they represent.”).
290. See id.
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